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The Indiana Environmental Policy Act:
Casting a New Role for a Forgotten Statutet
JEFFREY L. CARMICHAEL*

We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it
Their perch, and not their terror.'
The late 1960's witnessed a surge of concern for the environment.2 Faced
with the diminishing quality of the natural environment and the public's
perception that federal activities were accelerating this decline,3 the United
States Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 4 At
the heart of this Act lies a powerful action-forcing provision.' When
considering an action which will significantly affect the quality of the
environment, all federal agencies must prepare a detailed statement outlining
the action's environmental impact.6 In passing this Act, Congress not only
hoped to force federal agencies to consider the environmental effects of their
actions but also sought to encourage state governments to follow suit and take
their own steps to protect their environments.7
Inspired by Congress, many states enacted their own environmental policy
acts.8 These acts are significant, for they recognize that most environmental

t 0 1995 by Jeffrey L. Carmichael.
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, Augustana
College-Rock Island. Thanks to Professor Robert Fischman for his valuable guidance and to Judge
Wayne Penrod for reviewing an earlier draft of this work. Thanks also to Marcy Pauley and to James
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1.WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, Measure for Measure, in WILLIAm SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE
WoRKs act 2, sc. 1, lines 1-4 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988) (1603). As an
esoteric example of how the law may become too flexible to carry any real authority, note Captain
Renault's comment in Casablanca: "I have no conviction, if that is what you mean. I blow with the
wind." CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
2. In 1969, one U.S. Senator characterized the mood of the country as follows:
[There is a new kind of revolutionary movement underway in this country. This movement
is concemed with the integrity of man's life support system-the human environment. The
stage for this movement is shifting from what had once been the exclusive province of a few
conservation organizations to the campus, to the urban ghettos, and to the suburbs.
115 CONG. REc. 40,417 (statement of Sen. Jackson) (1969).
3. Id. at 19,010 (1969) (Excerpt from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Report on S.
1075) (giving examples of "rising public concern over the manner in which Federal policies and
activities have contributed to environmental decay and degradation").
4. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
5. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1.01, at 1-1 (2d ed. 1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1988).
7. 115 CONG. REc. 19,010 (1969) (Excerpt from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Report
on S.1075) ("It is the Committee's belief that S.1075 will also provide a model and a demonstration
to which State governments may look in their efforts to reorganize local institutions and to establish
local policies conducive to sound environmental management.!).
8. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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problems are caused by local actions-not federal projects.9 Although some
states have taken a different approach,'0 most have followed the federal
method, requiring environmental impact statements for certain major
projects." Several states, however, have attempted to improve their policy
acts by imposing additional procedural or substantive requirements on agency
decision-making. Some states have used broad statements of purpose to
emphasize environmental protection.' 2 Others have attempted to encourage
agencies to favor alternatives which will have a less substantial impact on the
environment.' 3 Still others have tried to use judicial review to prevent
agencies from making decisions that will have negative environmental
ramifications.' 4 Despite these additional requirements, the state courts have
been reluctant to limit agencies' discretion under the state environmental
policy acts.
Like many other states, Indiana has enacted its own environmental policy
act.' 5 For the most part, Indiana's statute is modeled after the federal act and
other state environmental policy acts,' 6 but there are some significant
differences. Unfortunately, these differences limit the scope of the Act and
prevent it from reaching its goals. 7 Indiana's statute, unlike its federal
predecessor, has fostered no litigation.' Indiana's chief environmental
administrative law judge has stated that the Act has never been a factor in any

9. 115 CONG. REc. 19,010 (1969) (Excerpt from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Report
on S.1075) ("[M]any of the most serious environmental problems the Nation farces are within the scope
and, often, within the exclusive jurisdiction of State action and State responsibility.").
10. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
11. For a list of states which require environmental impact statements, see infra note 84.
At their heart, state environmental policy acts attempt "to ensure that public agencies consider
environmental impacts along with other factors when they act." DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A.
MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 10.02[l], at 10-3 to -4 (1993). These acts "require that state
or local government agencies prepare environmental impact statements... analyzing the environmental
impacts of projects that the agencies propose to approve or carry out." Id. § 10.01, at 10-2. The required
content of the environmental impact statement is determined by statutes, regulations, or a combination
of both; however, environmental impact statements share a common purpose. As stated in Indiana's
regulations:
The purpose of an environmental impact statement is to relate environmental considerations
to the inception of the planning process, to examine alternative means of achieving the
intended purpose of the proposed action, to inform the public and other public agencies as
early as possible about proposed actions that may significantly affect the quality of the
environment, and to solicit comments which will assist the agency in the decision-making
process in determining the environmental consequences of the proposed action.
IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 326, r. 16-2-3(b)(1) (1992); see also id. tit. 327, r. 11-2-3(b)(1); id tit. 329, r.
5-2-3(b)(1).
12. See, e.g., State Environmental Policy Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.020(c) (West
1983).
13. See, e.g., State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. ENVTI.. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994).
14. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB.REs. CODE §§ 21168,21168.5 (West
1986).
15. Indiana Environmental Policy Act, IND. CODE §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (1993).
16. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4331 with IND. CODE § 13-1-10-3.
17. See infra notes 208-24 and accompanying text.
18. There isnot a single reported case which relies upon Indiana's Environmental Policy Act as a
basis for its decision.
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of his decisions. 9 While some agencies do submit environmental impact
statements,20 the Act has not been as successful as its siblings in ensuring
that agencies take environmental factors into account when making decisions.
This Note will focus on Indiana's Environmental Policy Act and ways of
making it into a more powerful tool for protecting the state's environment.
Part I will analyze the National Environmental Policy Act and three state
environmental policy acts. 2' The provisions of these statutes will be
considered, as will the development of the statutes by the state courts. Part II
focuses on the Indiana statute. Procedures under the Act will be explained,
differences between the Indiana statute and other state statutes analyzed, and
methods of challenging the agency before the court explored. Finally, Part III
will consider how Indiana's Act may be strengthened by adding provisions
similar to those found in other state statutes and by clarifying how an
agency's decision may be challenged in the courts.

I. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW STATUTES
In adopting its environmental policy act, Indiana followed the approach
chosen by the Federal Government and several other states.22 This Part will
examine some of these other environmental policy acts. The first section will
consider the National Environmental Policy Act, outline its operation, and
show how judicial interpretation of the Act has limited its effectiveness as an
environmental safeguard. The second section will explore the operation of
environmental policy acts of California, Washington, and New York,
discussing how-and why-these statutes differ from the federal act and from
each other. The third section will summarize the states' statutes, noting their
respective strengths and weaknesses. By considering the approaches of some
of its sister states and then revising its own environmental policy act, Indiana
can substantially advance its own goal of protecting the environment from
imprudent governmental action.

19. Interview with Wayne E. Penrod, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Indiana's Environmental
Boards, at the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, in Indianapolis, Ind. (Jan. 28, 1994)
[hereinafter Penrod Interview].
"The Indiana agency charged with administering what are commonly thought of as the 'environmental
laws' of the state is the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM"). Created by the
1985 Indiana General Assembly, IDEM came into existence on April 1, 1986." Thomas R. Newby et
al., Indiana Environmental Law: An Examination of 1989 Legislation, 23 IND. L. REv. 329, 331-32
(1990) (footnotes omitted). Indiana's environmental regulations are enforced by three boards: the Water
Pollution Control Board, the Air Pollution Control Board, and the Soil and Hazardous Waste
Management Board. Id. at 332. In addition, a financial management board oversees funding for IDEM.
20. Interview with Roy Francis, Environmental Impact Coordinator, Water Pollution Control Board,
at the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, in Indianapolis, Ind. (Jan. 28, 1994).
21. The states whose environmental policy acts will be considered in this Note are California,
Washington, and New York. These states were selected for two reasons. First, although each state
adopted the environmental impact statement requirement, their legislatures imposed additional
requirements to protect the environment. Second, these statutes have been the subject of extensive
litigation, which has clarified their provisions and, in some cases, even strengthened the statutes.,
22. See generallyFRANK P. GRAD, 2 TRFATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.08, at 9-292 to -315
(1994).
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A. The National Environmental Policy Act
On January 1, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") into law.23 Heralded by many as "the
Environmental Bill of Rights,'

24

NEPA requires federal agencies to conduct

environmental review before proceeding with actions that significantly affect
the environment. The Act has received mixed reviews over its twenty-fiveyear history. Supporters of NEPA contend that it has changed agency
decision-making procedures and made administrators more accessible and
accountable.2" Yet others assert that NEPA does not go far enough to protect
the environment, and at least one commentator has suggested that the courts'
interpretation of NEPA has seriously limited its effectiveness. 26 The Act has
been extremely influential, however, and its impact statement requirement has
been imitated by states and foreign nations in statutes covering a broad range
of issues.27 Because NEPA served as the model for the state environmental
policy acts which followed, an understanding of NEPA's form and history is
essential in order to understand environmental impact review by state
governments.
For analytical purposes, NEPA can be considered in three major sections.
First, NEPA declares strong substantive goals for protecting the environment.
Second, the Act imposes certain procedural obligations on all agencies of the
Federal Government. Third, NEPA authorizes the creation of the Council on
Environmental Quality, an agency responsible for overseeing NEPA's
implementation. Taken together, these three components emphasize the
importance of environmental factors in government decision-making.
23. In signing the Act, President Nixon commented that "[i]t is particularly fitting that my first
official act in this new decade is to approve the National Environmental Policy Act. ... We are
determined that the decade of the seventies will be known as the time when this country regained a
productive harmony between man and nature." 6 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 11 (Jan. 5, 1970).
24. Eva H. Hanks & John L. Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230, 269 (1970). "In form, the
National Environmental Policy Act is a statute; in spirit a constitution .. ."Id. at 245; see also GRAD,
supra note 22, § 9.01, at 9-6; Gary M. Ensdorff, Comment, The Agency for InternationalDevelopment
and NEPA: A Duty Unfullled, 67 WASH. L. REV. 133, 137 (1992); Heather E. Ross, Student Article,
Using NEPA in the Fightfor EnvironmentalJustice, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENmL. L. 353, 356 (1994).
25. Michael C. Blumm, The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act at Twenty: A Preface,20 ENVTL.
L. 447, 453 (1990).
26. Philip M. Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law
Adaptationsfrom NEPA 's Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVT. L. REV.207, 229 (1992).
27. William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in EnvironmentalLaw,
20 ENVTL. L. 485, 488 (1990).
This influence may have been one of the primary purposes behind NEPA. As one commentator
stated:
NEPA declared that the federal government would no longer be a leader in causing
environmental degradation. Instead, like the early American colonists whose settlements were
to be examples to the rest of the world, the federal government would become an example to
other governments and other countries. NEPA committed the entire federal bureaucracy to
maintain environmental quality and began a decade of unprecedented environmental legislation.
Blumm, supra note 25, at 448-49 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.

1995]

INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

However, the provisions of NEPA have usually been viewed in isolation from
each other, and the Act has not been as successful as some had hoped.
The Act begins with bold declarations of the congressional policies and
purposes behind 'the Act. 28 By enacting NEPA, Congress hoped to promote
efforts to prevent or eliminate damage to the environment.29 The substantive
policies stated in Section 101 include Congress' goals to "fulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations"; 30 to "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings"; 3' and to "achieve
a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities. 3 2
The procedural mandates of the Act are found in section 102. 33 In this
section, Congress demands that "all agencies of the federal government shall
... include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on...
the environmental impact of the proposed action."34 This environmental
impact statement ("EIS") must include a discussion of the action's adverse
environmental effects, 35 alternatives to the action, 36 and the resources which
would be committed to the action if it were implemented.37
To supervise NEPA's implementation, Congress created the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") within the Executive Office of the President. 38 The Act directs the CEQ to "develop and recommend to the President
national policies to foster and promote the improvement of environmental
quality .. . -39 Following this directive, the CEQ has enacted regulations to
clarify NEPA's provisions. 4' These regulations define NEPA's terminology4'
and explain how and when an EIS is to be prepared.42

28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1988).
29. Id. § 4321.
30. Id. § 4331(b)(1).
31. Id. § 4331(b)(2).

32. Id. § 4331(b)(5).
33. Id. § 4332 (1988).
34. Id. § 4332(C)(i).
35. Id. § 4332(C)(ii).
36. Id. § 4332(C)(iii).
37. Id. § 4332(C)(v).
38. Id. § 4342.

39. Id. § 4344(4) (1988).
40. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508.28 (1994).
41. Id. §§ 1508.1-1508.28 (1994).

42. Id. §§ 1500-1507.3 (1994). UnderNEPA and the CEQ regulations, the process ofenvironmental
impact review is relatively straightforward. While an agency is still contemplating an action, it should
determine whether an EIS is usually required for that type of action. Id. § 1501.4(a)(1). If the action
ordinarily requires an EIS, then the statement must be prepared. If the action could have a significant
impact on'the environment, the agency may conduct an environmental assessment to determine whether
to prepare an EIS. I. § 1501.A(b). This assessment may lead the agency to conclude that no EIS is
required or may lead to an EIS. Impact statements are required only for "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
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Significantly, NEPA remains silent on several issues which have been major
concerns for the public and the courts. For example, is judicial review
authorized under the Act? If so, what standard of review should be used?
Finally, what is the relationship between the substantive policies of section
101 and the procedural obligations of section 102? Ultimately, NEPA's failure
to address these questions may be its greatest failing, for the scope of the Act
has been severely limited as the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
drawn their own conclusions.43
The first major case to address these questions was Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,'
in which Judge Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia Circuit staked out
a significant role for NEPA in the federal agencies. Judge Wright noted that
the Act "makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every
federal agency and department. '45 Calvert Cliffs' also addressed the type of
analysis agencies must employ under the Act. Wright stated that "all agencies
must use a 'systematic, interdisciplinary approach' to environmental planning
and evaluation 'in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment.' ' 4 1 While the court emphasized the importance of NEPA's
procedures, it also recognized that "the general substantive policy of the Act
is a flexible one. '47 As Wright stated:
We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular
sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially
enforceable duties. The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a
substantive decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown
that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary
or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the
decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and
If an EIS is required, the agency begins by preparing a draft EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a). This draft
is then circulated among the other agencies and the general public, who have the opportunity to
comment upon the statement. Id. §§ 1503.1-3.4. After the notice and comment period, the agency
prepares a final EIS, which should incorporate the comments of the public and the agencies. Id.
§§ 1502.9, 1503.4. Preparing this statement and considering it in the decision-making process completes
the agency's procedural obligations under NEPA.
43. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
44. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
45. Id. at 1112. Previously, many agencies-including the Commission-had contended that they
had no authority to take environmental factors into account when making decisions. "The Atomic
Energy Commission... had continually asserted, prior to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to
concern itselfwith the adverse environmental effects of its actions." Id. This position was upheld in New
Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,395 U.S. 962 (1969). After
Calvert Cliffs, however, the Commission was not only permitted but required to consider the
environmental impact of its decisions.
46. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1113. Under this analysis, agencies must weigh environmental costs
against economic and technical benefits to determine the proper course. "In some instances
environmental costs may outweigh economic and technical benefits and in other instances they may not
But NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing analysis in each instance." Id.
47. Id. at 1112.
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balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in good faith-it

is the responsibility of the courts to reverse. 8
Although the court recognized that NEPA's emphasis is procedural, it also
believed that Congress did not wish the Act to be treated as a "paper
tiger."49 Rather, Congress designed the procedural obligations to ensure that
agencies would exercise their substantive authority under the Act. 0 Despite
the fact that section 102 of NEPA requires nothing more than the preparation
of an impact statement, Wright found that the Act demands that environmental
factors receive a hard look.5' The Act requires that an EIS "accompany"
proposals through the agency review process. 52 The word "accompany" must
be read "to indicate ... that environmental factors, as compiled in the

'detailed statement,' be considered through agency review processes." 3 In
short, although the court acknowledged that the primary focus of NEPA is
procedural in nature, it also recognized that NEPA's broad substantive goals
cannot be achieved if the agency does not seriously consider the environmental dangers explained in the EIS. Therefore, NEPA requires the agency
48. Id. at 1115. In holding that NEPA was reviewable by the courts, the D.C. Circuit relied heavily
upon Citizens to PreserveOverton Parkv. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court
applied the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that the action of "each authority of the
United States" is subject to judicial review unless the "statutes preclude judicial review" or "agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). The Court found "no
indication that Congress sought to prohibit judicial review." OvertonPark 401 U.S. at 410. The Court
also determined that the exception for decisions "committed to agency discretion" is very narrow. Id.
This exception is only applicable "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms
that in a given case there is no law to apply."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26
(1945)).
OvertonParkis now known for creating the "hard look" standard, even though the words "hard look"
do not appear in the opinion. The Court stated:
[The Administrative Procedure Act] requires a finding that the actual choice made was not
"arbitray, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."... To
make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment.... . Although this
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard ofreview is a narrow
one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
49. The court stated: "Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger. Indeed, the
requirement of environmental consideration 'to the fullest extent possible' sets a high standard for the
agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts." Calvert Cliffs,
449
F.2d at 1114.
50. Id. at 1112.
51. See supra note 48.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
53. Calvert Cliffs' 449 F.2d at 1117-18 (emphasis in original). The court also stated:
What possible purpose could there be in the Section 102(2)(C) requirement (that the "detailed
statement" accompany proposals through agency review processes) if "accompany" means no
more than physical proximity-mandating no more than the physical act of passing certain
folders and papers, unopened, to reviewing officials along with other folders and papers? What
possible purpose could there be in requiring the "detailed statement" to be before hearing
boards, if the boards are free to ignore entirely the contents of the statement? NEPA was meant
to do more than regulate the flow of papers in the federal bureaucracy. The word "accompany"
in Section 102(2)(C) must not be read so narrowly as to make the Act ludicrous.
Id. at 1117.
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not only to prepare a "detailed statement" but also to take a hard look at the
statement's content.
The Supreme Court, however, has taken a far less expansive view of NEPA.
In its twelve cases construing the statute, the Court has consistently rejected
invitations to interpret the statute broadly.54 In fact, the Court has never
decided a case-or even a single issue in a case-in favor of a NEPA
plaintiff.55 Most significantly, the Court has limited judicial review of
agencies' compliance with NEPA. In a series of decisions, the Court has
deferred to agency discretion and limited the federal courts to ensuring
procedural compliance with the Act.
The process used by the Court to limit NEPA is, at best, unusual. The
Court's first words on the Act's substantive role came in a footnote to Kleppe
v. Sierra Club. 6 In language unrelated to the holding and only marginally
related to the issues in the case, Justice Powell stated that NEPA and its
legislative history do not suggest that a court should substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. 7 Rather, a reviewing court's sole responsibility "is
to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken."' 58
The Court revisited NEPA's substantive role in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 9 That case, like
Calvert Cliffs', focused on the environmental procedures of the Atomic
Energy Commission. The Court held that, unless the Constitution or
"compelling circumstances" demand otherwise, administiative agencies should
be free to create their own procedures.6 0 In dicta,6' then-Justice Rehnquist
stated that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation,
but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. '62 He also noted

54. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989); Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,
460 U.S. 766 (1983); Weinberger .v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139 (1981); Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (consolidating two cases); Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976);
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP II"), 422
U.S. 289 (1975); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP I"),
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
55. David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanationsfor a
12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551, 553 (1990).
56. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
57. Id. at 410 n.21.
58. Id. (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
59. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
60. Id. at 543.
61. Justice Rehnquist prefaced the Court's comments on NEPA by stating, "All this leads us to
make one further observation of some relevance to this case." Id. at 557. The tone of this language,
together with its placement at the end of the opinion, indicates that the comments were not essential to
the Court's holding.
62. Id. at 558.
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that the Act's purpose is to "insure a fully informed and well-considered decision"-not to compel any particular substantive result. 63 It should be
emphasized that this language, like the footnote in Kleppe, was not essential
to the Court's holding.
The Supreme Court completely shut the door to substantive review of NEPA
in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen.64 In a nine-paragraph per
curiam opinion, the Court held that substantive review of agency action is not
available under NEPA. 65 The Court emphasized that the Act imposes
"essentially procedural" duties on federal agencies. 66 It found that Vermont
Yankee "cuts sharply against the Court of Appeals' conclusion that an
agency... must elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate
considerations. ' 67 Rather, after the agency "has made a decision subject to
NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the
agency has considered the environmental consequences.
Dissenting from the Court's opinion, Justice Marshall disagreed with the
suggestion that "Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially
mindless task of determining whether an agency 'considered' environmental
factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those
factors in reaching its conclusion. 69 Instead, Justice Marshall believed that
the agency's decision may still be reversed by the courts if it is "'arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.' 70 If the agency fails to take a hard look at environmental consequences, its decision may be reversed by the court.7 '
Various explanations have been advanced for the Supreme Court's less than
generous approach to NEPA. One commentator has suggested that the Court
has merely attempted to control the expansion of NEPA by the lower federal
courts. 72 Another has posited that the opinions are motivated by the Court's
fear of judicial intervention in administrative decisions.73 A third has
proposed that the Court's positions are not motivated by any opinion about the
statute itself but are instead the result of the Solicitor General's control over
the Court's docket. 74

63. Id.
64. 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam).

65. Id. at 227-28.
66. Id. at 227 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall also pointed out that "Vermont Yankee does not
stand for the broad proposition that the majority advances today. The relevant passage in that opinion
was meant to be only a 'further observation of some relevance to this case."' Id. at 229 (quoting
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 557).
70. Id. at 229 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
71. Id.
72. Rodgers, supra note 27, at 497.
73. Ferester, supra note 26, at 217.
74. Shilton, supra note 55, at 555-56.
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Regardless of the reason, however, the substantive erosion of NEPA has
begun to affect the statute's procedural effectiveness."5 This effect manifests
itself in three ways. First, there has been a dramatic decline in the number of
impact statements prepared by the federal agencies.7 6 Second, fewer NEPA
lawsuits are being filed. 7 Third, fewer petitions for review of NEPA
decisions are being filed with the Supreme Court.7 Any one of these factors
in isolation might not be cause for concern; but together they show that
environmental plaintiffs are not using NEPA as frequently as they had in the
past. Since Strycker's Bay, the best remedy a plaintiff can hope to achieve is
to delay the agency's action. Because NEPA depends upon environmental
plaintiffs to bring actions, its substantive decay has affected its procedural
mandates.
In sum, NEPA blends strong substantive goals with stringent procedural
requirements. Initially, the Act was interpreted broadly by the federal courts.
Agencies not only had to prepare impact statements but were also required to
consider seriously the potential environmental impacts those statements
revealed. The Supreme Court, however, has eliminated substantive review of
NEPA. If the agency meets its procedural obligations, then the court should
not intervene. This substantive trimming has adversely affected NEPA as a
procedural statute. Commentators have also noted that "some courts now seem
to be reviewing agency action under NEPA far less closely than they review
other types of agency action."79 For NEPA to be more effective, Congress
should amend the Act and make its substantive role clearer.
B. EnvironmentalReview in the Several States
In the wake of NEPA, many states began to reconsider their own environmental policies. Eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
have enacted "Little NEPA's," statutes mandating some form of environmental
review. 0 One of these states, New Mexico, passed but later repealed its

75. For a valuable discussion of the effects of ignoring NEPA's substantive provisions (including
charts illustrating the decline in impact statements, NEPA suits, and Supreme Court petitions), see
Ferester, supra note 26, at 223-30.
76. Id at 224-26.
77. Id. at 226-28.
78. Id. at 228-29.
79. Richard I. Goldsmith & William C. Banks, Environmental Values: InstitutionalResponsibility
and the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983).
As another commentator noted:
Thus, we have-after two decades-a National Environmental Policy Act that has changed
agency decision making processes and made administrators more accessible and accountable
to the public, but which requires nothing specific in terms of environmental quality. NEPA
students are always surprised (and disappointed) to learn that the nation's environmental policy
consists of one part information disclosure, one part public participation, and eight parts
administrative discretion.
Blumm, supra note 25, at 453.
80. The following states and territories have enacted environmental policy acts: California,
California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21178.1 (West 1986 & Supp.
1994); Connecticut, Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971, CONN.GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-14
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environmental review statute." In addition, several states have executive
orders which establish procedures similar to NEPA.82 Many other states

require environmental review only under specific circumstances.83

In enacting their environmental policy acts, many states have attempted to
incorporate the substantive element lacking in NEPA. 4 Most states,

including Indiana, have modeled their acts more closely after NEPA.85
Though the various state approaches differ somewhat, these statutes share a
common purpose: "to ensure that public agencies consider environmental
impacts along with other factors when they act." 6 Therefore, each state act

requires some level of environmental impact analysis before major government actions may proceed.
Like NEPA,8 7 many of the state environmental policy acts contain broad
statements of purpose and policy."s Most of these acts have language which
closely tracks-or even duplicates-NEPA's purpose and policy statements,
but some states have set forth more ambitious objectives. Washington's

to -20 (1985 & Supp. 1994); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-981 to -990 (Supp. 1994);
Florida, Environmental Protection Act of 1971, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1993); Georgia,
Environmental Policy Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16-1 to -8 (1992 & Supp. 1994); Hawaii, HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 343-1 to -8 (1985 & Supp. 1992); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (1993); Maryland,
Maryland Environmental Policy Act, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1989);
Massachusetts, Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MAss. GEN. L. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (1983 &
Supp. 1994); Michigan, Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); Minnesota, Minnesota
Environmental Policy Act of 1973, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.07 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994);
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -3-324 (1993);'New York, State Environmental Quality
Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994); North
Carolina, North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-I to 113A-10
(1993); Puerto Rico, Public Policy Environmental Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1121-1142 (1977 &
Supp. 1991); South Dakota, South Dakota Environmental Policy Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 34A-9-1 to -13 (1992 & Supp 1994); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1182 to -1192 (Michie
1993); Washington, State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010.914 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); Wisconsin, Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§1.11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
See also Nicholas A. Robinson, SEQRA 's Siblings: Precedentsfrom Little NEPA 's in the Sister
States, 46 ALB. L. REV.1155, 1157-58 (1982).
81. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-20-1 to -7 (Supp. 1973), repealed by 1974 N.M. Laws ch. 46, § 1.
82. E.g., Michigan, Exec. Order 1991-31 (1991); New Jersey, Exec. OrderNo. 215 (1989);,see also
Robinson, supra note 80, at 1158.
83. States with limited environmental impact review requirements include the following: Delaware,
Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-7004 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Kentucky, Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 278.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989 & Supp. 1994); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:2021 (West 1989); Mississippi, Coastal Wetlands Protection Act, Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-27
(1972 & Supp. 1994); Nebraska, Environmental Protection Act §§ 81-1501 to -1532 (1987 & Supp.
1993); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.640-.770 (1994); New Jersey, Coastal Area Facility Review
Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -27 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); Oregon, OR.REV.STAT. § 519.979
(1993); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1611 (1975); Rhode Island, Rhode Island
Environmental Rights Act, ILL. GEN. LAWS § 10-20-8(b) (1985); see also Robinson, supra note 80, at
1158.
84. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.07.
85. Ferester, supra note 26, at 209.
86. SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 11, § 10.0211], at 10-3 to -4.
87. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., CAL. Put. REs. CODE §§ 21000, 21001 (West 1986); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW
§§ 8-0101, -0103 (McKinney 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010, .020 (West 1983).
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statute, for example, provides that "[t]he legislature recognizes that each
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment and
that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation ... of
the environment." 89 Courts occasionally cite to these sections of the statutes
and interpret the acts broadly, basing their decisions upon the legislature's
intent. 90 However, courts usually do not view these sections as central
components of the acts and often ignore the provisions when construing the
statute's scope. 9'
The procedural requirements of these state environmental policy acts also
mirror the procedures under NEPA.92 If an agency's project will not have a
significant impact on the environment, then the agency will not have to
conduct an environmental review. If the agency is uncertain of its proposed
action's potential effects, it will have to conduct an initial study. Again, if
there is no significant impact on the environment, no environmental review
is required. If there may be significant impact, then the agency must prepare
an impact statement. As with NEPA, the agency begins by circulating a draft
statement and receiving comments from other agencies and the public. The
final impact statement incorporates the comments received by the agency.
Though specific requirements vary by state, the agencies usually must discuss
the significant impacts of the project, mitigation measures to minimize those
impacts, and alternatives which may be more environmentally favorable.
Among these state statutes, the most significant are those of California,
Washington, and New York. These three populous states have modified
NEPA's EIS requirement with certain substantive and procedural changes.
Indiana can benefit from the experiences of these three states in reforming its
own environmental policy act.
1. The California Environmental Quality Act
Among the states, California was the first to follow the Federal Government's lead and enact an environmental policy act. The California Environmental Quality Act93 ("CEQA"), enacted just eight months after NEPA,94
requires the preparation of an environmental impact report ("EIR") before the
government can proceed with a proposal that may affect the environment. The
kinship with NEPA is important, for the California courts have relied upon

89. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.2 1C.020(c). This language has no counterpart in NEPA. Although
the Senate included a similar provision in its original version of NEPA, the conference committee
removed this language. 115 CONG. REc. 19,008 (1969); see also Ferester, supra note 26, at 223 & n.
91.
90. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 113-16 (discussing Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 764 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1988)), 169-77 (discussing Jackson v. New York Urban Dev. Corp., 494
N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986)) and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 42.
93. California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. RES.CODE §§ 21000-21178.1.
94. Ferester, supra note 26, at 231.
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NEPA in interpreting CEQA. 95 This relationship actually cuts both ways; the
Council on Environmental Quality ("Council") drew upon CEQA when
enacting its regulations to implement NEPA. 96
The California Act differs from NEPA in four significant respects. First, the
threshold for requiring the "detailed statement" is lower under CEQA than it
is under NEPA. Under NEPA, an EIS is required for "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 97 Under
CEQA, an EIR is required for any action that the agencies "propose to carry
out or approve which may have a significant effect on the environment.""
Under NEPA, an agency might not have to prepare an EIR for actions which
could have some environmental impact. Under CEQA, a project which might
have an environmental impact must be accompanied by an EIS. By requiring
an EIR for projects which may significantly affect the environment, the
California Legislature advances its goal of forcing agencies to consider the
environmental effects of their actions.
Second, CEQA defines several of its essential terms.9 9 By contrast, NEPA
contains no definitions but relies on the Council's regulations to define its
essential terms. Although the federal courts defer to the Council regulations,
there are certain advantages to enacting statutory definitions. Defining its
terms gives the California Legislature more control over the scope of
CEQA. 10 D Establishing statutory definitions also encourages consistent
interpretations of the statute. For example, the term "environment" may be
interpreted broadly or narrowly. Without some form of guidance, the courts
would spend years developing a common law test for when an action "may
have a significant effect on the environment." Instead, CEQA provides that
environment "means the physical conditions which exist within the area which
.will be affected by a proposed project, including land, air, water, minerals,
flora, fauna, noise, [and] objects of historic or aesthetic significance."' 0 '
This definition clarifies the scope of the Act and leads to more consistent
application.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, CEQA requires agencies to mitigate
whenever feasible. Although NEPA requires that agencies discuss mitignt!on

95. See, e.g., No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1975); Friends of Mammoth
v. Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972).
96. Daniel P. Selmi, The JudicialDevelopment of the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 197, 198 (1984).

97. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
98. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West 1986) (emphasis added).

99. Id. §§ 21060-21069 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
100. If, for example, California entrusted an agency with defining CEQA's terms, that agency would
have a great deal of influence over when the statute would apply. The legislature defines "project' to
include activities directly undertaken by the agency, activities supported by the agency, and activities
permitted or authorized by the agency. Id. § 21065 (West 1986). If the legislature were to leave
construction of the term to an agency, the agency might decide that "project" refers only to actions
undertaken by an agency. Although this interpretation is not inconsistent with the statute's goals, it
would severely limit the statute's application. Thus, the legislature maintains a higher degree of control
by defining the statutory terms itself.
101. Id. § 21060.5 (West 1986).
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measures and alternatives in the impact statement, those measures do not have
to be implemented. By contrast, CEQA provides that "[e]ach public agency
shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects
it approves or carries out whenever it is feasible to do so. ' '° This substantive requirement mandates that agencies take action to offset the adverse
environmental effects of their projects whenever feasible, but it does not
absolutely prohibit the agency from approving projects with adverse
environmental effects. If "economic, social, or other conditions" make
alternatives or mitigation measures "infeasible," then a project may be
approved despite its environmental impacts.' 3 Nevertheless, by encouraging
adoption of alternatives and mitigation measures and by requiring agencies to
make findings that other options are not feasible, the legislature advances
CEQA's substantive goals.
Finally, CEQA distinguishes itself from NEPA by authorizing two standards
of judicial review. If the agency's decision was the subject of a formal
hearing, then the reviewing court must consider whether the agency acted
beyond the scope of its authority, whether there was a fair trial, and whether
there was prejudicial abuse of discretion.' 4 In all other cases, the review is
limited to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion by the
agency.0" Ultimately, these two standards of review are not widely
divergent. Each allows the agency's determination to be overruled "only if it
does not comply with the procedure required by law or is not supported by
substantial evidence."' What is most significant is not the level of review
autlioprized but the mere discussion of judicial review in the statute. By
including these provisions, the legislature ensured that administrative
decisions would receive a certain amount of judicial scrutiny.
Judicial development of CEQA has been very similar to that under NEPA.
The first California Supreme Court case construing CEQA, Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors,'7 takes an expansive reading very
similar' to Calvert Cliffs'' 0 8 In Friends of Mammoth, the issue was whether
CEQA applied to private activities requiring a permit or some other

102. Id. § 21002.1(b) (West 1986).
103. Id. § 21002 (West 1986).
104. The'statute provides that a challenge "on the grounds of noncompliance with the provisions of
this division shall be in accordance with the provisions of Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure." Id. § 21168. Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure states:
(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has
proceeded without, or in excess ofjurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there
was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has
not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the
findings, or,the findings are not supported by the evidence.
CAL. CIV. PROC., CODE § 1094.5(b) (1980 & Supp. 1994).
105. "Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law
or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence." CAL. PUB. RFs. CODE
§ 21168.5.
106. Selmi, supra note 96, at 222.
107. 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972).
108. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971); see also supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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government approval. 9 Since the statute did not define which actions were
subject to the permit process, the court looked to the purposes and policies

behind the statute," 0 and found that the legislature intended CEQA to apply

broadly. The court concluded that "the Legislature intended the [Act] to be
interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the
environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language."'''
Therefore, the court held that the Act should apply to private activities

requiring government permission." 2
In recent years, however, the California Supreme Court has narrowed its

approach to CEQA. The modern interpretation is well illustrated by Laurel
3
Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the University of California."

The court noted that "[a]n EIR is an 'environmental "alarm bell" whose
purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental
changes before they have reached ecological points of no return."' 1 4 The
courts, however, are to consider the sufficiency of the EIR as an informative
document-not the correctness of the conclusions reached.,' The reviewing
court "may not set aside an agency's approval of an EIR on the ground that

an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable.""' 6
Like the federal courts evaluating NEPA, the California Supreme Court has
shifted its focus to CEQA's procedural elements. Nevertheless, the substantive
109. Friendsof Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1052. At that time, since CEQA did not include a definition
of "project," the court could not rely upon the statute or the regulations. Rather, this case illustrates the
significant role California's courts have played in developing CEQA. The interpretation adopted by the
court was later enacted into law as part of CEQA. See CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE § 21065(g) (West 1986).
110. Friendsof Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1054.
111. Id. at 1056.
112. The court stated: "We... conclude that to achieve that maximum protection the Legislature
necessarily intended to include within the operation of the act, private activities for which a government
permit or other entitlement for use is necessary." Id
California's supreme court also interpreted CEQA broadly in No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
529 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1975). Faced with the question of whether an EIR was required, the court followed
the broad interpretation of Friends of Mammoth in concluding that CEQA imposes a low threshold
requirement for the preparation of an EIR. Id. at 76. Therefore, an EIR should be prepared whenever
the agency perceives some substantial evidence that the project may have significant environmental
effects or whenever the action arguably may have adverse environmental impacts. Id. at 77. In fact, "the
existence of serious public controversy concerning the environmental effect of a project in itself
indicates that preparation of an EIR is desirable." Id. at 78. Essentially, the court held that an EIR
should be prepared whenever the agency is in doubt about its project's potential impacts. Id.
113. 764 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1988).
114. Id. at 282 (quoting County of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)).
115. Id. at 283. As the court stated:
A court's task is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has the better argument
when the dispute is whether adverse effects have been mitigated or could be better mitigated.
We have neither the resources nor scientific expertise to engage in such analysis, even if the
statutorily prescribed standard of review permitted us to do so. Our limited function is
consistent with the principle that "The purpose of CEQA is not to generate paper, but to
compel government at all levels to make decisions with environmental consequences in mind.
CEQA does not, indeed cannot, guarantee that these decisions will always be those which favor
environmental considerations:'
Id. (quoting Bozng v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 529 P.2d 1017, 1030 (Cal. 1975)).
116. Id.
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elements of CEQA will ensure that the statute continues to play a significant
role for years to come.

2. Washington's State Environmental Policy Act
Two years after the Federal Government and California adopted their
environmental policy acts, the State of Washington followed suit and enacted
the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 ("SEPA")." 7 Like California,
Washington drew heavily on NEPA's provisions in creating this Act. In fact,
SEPA is much more closely related to NEPA than its California counterpart." 8 Yet Washington took a far bolder approach than either of those acts
by recognizing that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to
a healthful environment."" 9 Washington's courts have invoked this
provision in interpreting the statute broadly. Washington's supreme court has
stated that this language "indicates in the strongest possible terms the basic
importance of environmental concerns to the people of this state."O2
Like CEQA, SEPA differs from NEPA in several significant respects. First,
Washington's courts have set a lower threshold for determining whether
review under SEPA is required. Washington's supreme court has stated that
"the procedural requirements of SEPA ...should be invoked whenever more
than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable
probability.''
Second, SEPA allows for some actions to be "categorically exempt" from
its requirements. Such actions do not require preparation of an impact
statement.12 The legislature did not set out what these actions are, however.
Instead, it left the task of determining which actions should be categorically
exempt to the Department of Ecology. The Department was required to adopt
rules specifying the types of government action "which are not to be
considered ... major actions significantly affecting the quality of the
environment."' 23 The term "categorical exemption" is something of a
misnomer, 24 however, for the Act states that exemptions "shall be limited
to those types which are not major actions significantly affecting the quality
of the environment."' 25 Rather, the rules establish which actions fall below

117. 1971 Wash. Laws ch. 109 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010-

.914).
118. For a table showing the provisions of SEPA and their sources in NEPA, see Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 513 P.2d 36, 45 n.5 (Wash. 1973).
119. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.020(3) (West 1983); see also supra note 89 and
accompanying text.

120. Leshi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 525 P.2d 774, 781 (Wash.
1974); see also Ferester, supra note 26, at 242.
121. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 552 P.2d 674, 680
(Wash. 1976) (en banc).

122. WASH. REv.

CODE

ANN. § 43.21C.031 (West Supp. 1994).

123. Id. § 43.21C.110(i)(a) (West Supp. 1994).
124. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Washington EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 33, 45

(1984).
125. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.110(1)(a).
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the threshold of requiring review. By making this determination in advance,
clarified the scope of SEPA and eased the burden
the Washington Legislature
26
on the state courts.1
Third, SEPA gives agencies the substantive authority to deny permits based
on environmental factors. The Act provides that "[a]ny government action
may be conditioned or denied pursuant to this chapter."' 27 This grant of
authority is SEPA's strongest substantive sword. 21 Before environmental
policy statutes were enacted, many agencies did not feel that they had the
authority to consider environmental factors when making decisions. Although
NEPA and the state policy acts do allow the agencies to consider the impact
on the environment, agencies may still be reluctant to base their decisions on
environmental factors. By including this provision, SEPA encourages the
agencies to seriously consider the information in the EIS. Washington's
agencies have been willing to refuse permits based on this provision, and the
courts generally have been willing to uphold these refusals.' 29
Fourth, like CEQA, SEPA establishes a standard for judicial review.
Plaintiffs may challenge agency actions which fail to comply with SEPA's
substantive or procedural provisions. 30 Generally, however, the state's

126. In the absence of a rule, the courts would have to determine whether an action significantly
affects the environment. This determination would be made on a case-by-case basis, which would result
in a surge of litigation as plaintiffs and defendants learned which actions require review before approval.
Eventually, the courts would establish standards to narrow the scope of SEPA, but the legislature spared
them this process by allowing rules to be promulgated to answer these threshold questions.
127. This section of SEPA provides as follows:
Any governmental action may be conditioned or denied pursuant to this chapter- Provided,
That such conditions or denials shall be based upon policies identified by the appropriate
governmental authority and incorporated into regulations, plans, or codes which are formally
designated by the agency (or appropriate legislative body, in the case of local government) as
possible bases for the exercise of authority pursuant to this chapter.... Such action may be
conditioned only to mitigate specific adverse environmental impacts which are identified in the
environmental documents prepared under this chapter. These conditions shall be stated in
writing by the decisionmaker. Mitigation measures shall be reasonable and capable of being
accomplished. In order to deny a proposal under this chapter, an agency must find that: (1) The
proposal would result in significant adverse impacts identified in a final or supplemental
environmental impact statement prepared under this chapter, and (2) reasonable mitigation
measures are insufficient to mitigate the identified impact ....
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.060 (West Supp. 1994) (italics in original).
128. This statutory provision was not part of the original SEPA. In fact, it was created by
Washington's supreme court in Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 578 P.2d 1309 (Wash. 1978). In that
case, the plaintiff corporation contended that SEPA was intended only to serve an informational purpose
and that it did not grant the agency the authority to refuse a building permit. The court concluded that
SEPA's broad mandate "would be meaningless under the facts of this matter if the superintendent was
powerless to decide in the manner that 'full consideration of environmental impacts' impelled." Id. at
1312. Therefore, the court held that SEPA confers substantive authority on agencies to deny permits on
the basis of adverse environmental impacts. Id. at 1313.
Later, the Washington Legislature enacted § 43.21C.060, which codified this holding. Polygon is a
valuable illustration of how the court can play a vital role in expanding a state's environmental policy
act.
129. See, e.g., Victoria Tower Partnership v. City of Seattle, 800 P.2d 380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990),
review denied, 807 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1991); State v. Lake Lawrence Pub. Land Protection Ass'n, 601
P.2d 494 (Wash. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
130. "The State Environmental Policy Act provides a basis for challenging whether governmental
action is in compliance with the substantive and procedural provisions of this chapter." WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.21C.075(l) (West Supp. 1994).
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courts defer to the agency's decision. The statute itself provides that a
government agency's decisions should be given "substantial weight.''
Like other courts construing environmental policy acts, Washington's courts
have held that SEPA's mandate is procedural, not substantive. In 1973,
Washington's supreme court found that SEPA does not demand any particular
substantive result since the statute itself provides that environmental factors
32
should be examined along with economic and technical considerations.
Rather, SEPA requires that the government give "appropriate consideration"
to the environment in its decision-making process.'
The statute is the
state's attempt to shape the environment's future by deliberation, not 34
default,
and requires that environmental factors be considered to the fullest.
The court took a more active approach to SEPA in Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass n v. King County Council.'3 5 In Norway Hill, the
dispute centered upon the appropriate level of review for an agency's
determination that an action would have no significant environmental
impact. 3 6 The court observed that reviewing such decisions under the
"arbitrary and capricious standard" would allow agencies to avoid SEPA's
requirements since their decisions rarely could be reversed.' 37 Therefore, the
court decided that the appropriate standard for review would be the "clearly
erroneous standard." 131 Under this standard, an agency's decision can be
reversed, despite supporting evidence in the record, if the reviewing court "'is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has bedn committed.""' 139 The court stated that "[t]he 'clearly erroneous' standard provides
a broader review than the 'arbitrary or capricious' standard because it
mandates a review of the entire record and all the evidence rather than just
a search for substantial evidence to support the administrative finding or
decision."14 Therefore, the court concluded that the "clearly erroneous"
standard should be applied since that standard "will allow a reviewing court
to give substantial weight to the agency determination as required by [SEPA],
yet at the same time it will allow a reviewing court to consider properly 'the

131. "In any action involving an attack on a determination by a governmental agency relative to the
requirement or the absence of the requirement, or the adequacy of a 'detailed statement,' the decision
of the governmental agency shall be accorded substantial weight" Id. § 43.2 1C.090 (West 1983).
132. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 508 P.2d 166, 172 (Wash. 1973).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 171-72.
135. 552 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1976) (en bane).
136. Id. at 677.
137. Id. at 678. "'[Without a judicial check, the temptation would be to short-circuit the process by
setting statement thresholds as high as possible within the vague bounds of the arbitrary or capricious
standard."' Id. (quoting Frederick R. Anderson, Jr., The NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 361 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974)).
138. Id. at 679.
139. Id. at 678 (quoting Ancheta v. Daly, 461 P.2d 531, 534 (Wash. 1969) (citation omitted)).
140. Id. In a footnote, the court noted that "[ifn an appropriate case an administrative decision could
be 'arbitrary and capricious,' e.g., where there is no evidence in the record to support it, and yet not be
clearly erroneous."' Id. at 678 n.5 (italics in original) (citing Stempel v. Department of Water
Resources, 508 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1973)).
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public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision
or order."""'
It is now well established that SEPA, like CEQA and NEPA, is essentially
a procedural statute which does not mandate any particular substantive
result.'42 Nevertheless, SEPA still has a significant substantive role in
preserving Washington's environment. Most significantly, SEPA allows
government agencies to refuse permits on environmental grounds or to impose
environmental conditions before the permit is granted. This provision, along
with SEPA's other substantive provisions, allows the agency to seriously
pursue the statute's broad mandate.
3. New York's State Environmental Quality Review Act
Unlike California and Washington, the State of New York did not respond
immediately to NEPA. Instead, it waited several years before adopting an
environmental policy act. New York enacted its State Environmental Quality
Review Act ("SEQRA") 43 in 1975, six years after the passage of NEPA and
CEQA. By waiting, New York was able to draw upon the experience of other
state acts' 44 and to adopt the provisions it felt would best advance its own
environmental goals. Therefore, SEQRA differs from NEPA in several
significant respects.
First, like CEQA, SEQRA contains definitions of some of its essential
terms. 41 Many of these definitions suggest SEQRA should be applied
broadly. The definition of environment, for example, includes all the elements
of CEQA's definition but adds patterns of population concentration or growth
and community character.' 6 Thus, environmental review includes socioeconomic factors which might not have to be reviewed in other states. In
addition, SEQRA applies to all agency actions, and "agency" is defined to
include state and local agencies. 47 "Action" is also interpreted broadly and
includes four separate types of action: projects undertaken by agencies;
projects sponsored or supported by agencies; projects permitted by agencies;
and policy, regulations, and procedure making. 14' This definition includes

141. Id. at 679 (quoting Ancheta, 461 P.2d at 534-35).
142. Save Our Rural Env't v. Snohomish County, 662 P.2d 816, 820 (Wash. 1983).
143. State Environmental Quality Review Act, 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 612 (codified as amended at N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117).
144. In composing SEQRA's provisions, New York's legislators worked extensively with the drafters
of CEQA. Robinson, supra note 80, at 1160.
145. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105 (MeKinney 1984).
146. Id. § 8-0105(3). '"Environment' means the physical conditions which will be affected by a
proposed action, including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic
significance, existing patterns of population concentration, distribution or growth, and existing
community or neighborhood character." Id. § 8-0105(6).

147. Id. § 8-0105(3).
148. Id. § 8-0105(4). The Act provides as follows:
"Actions" include: (i) projects or activities directly undertaken by any agency; or projects or
activities supported in whole or part through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms
of funding assistance from one or more agencies; or projects involving the issuance to a person
of a lease, permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act by one
or more agencies; [and] (ii) policy, regulations, and procedure making.
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more activities than does CEQA, which mentions only the first three types of
actions.
Actions subject to review under SEQRA receive further definition through
the state's regulations. Section 8-0113 of the Act requires the Commissioner
to adopt rules and regulations to implement SEQRA's provisions. 49 Among
these rules and regulations, the Commissioner must establish criteria to
determine what actions may have significant impact on the environment;
specifically, the Commissioner must identify those actions or classes of
actions which are likely to require impact statements, as well as actions or
classes of actions which are not likely to require impact statements. 150 Such
regulations have been enacted,15 1 and they divide actions into two distinct
52
groups. Type I actions are those which usually will require an EIS,1
including adoption of a land use plan, large sales of land, and zoning
changes. 53 By contrast, Type II actions are those actions which usually will
not require an EIS," 4 including replacement of a facility with the same kind
of facility, repaving an existing highway, and agricultural farm management
practices. 5 5 Though not exhaustive lists, these regulations provide valuable
guidance for agencies planning their activities.' 56
Second, SEQRA's procedural provisions extend further than NEPA's. Under
NEPA, an agency must prepare an EIS for "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." 5 7 By contrast, SEQRA
requires agencies to prepare an EIS for any actions "they propose or approve
which may have a significant effect on the environment."' 5' Like Washington, New York has extended the scope of its statute by requiring an EIS for
Id. The Act also provides that actions do not include enforcement proceedings, "official acts of a
ministerial nature, involving no exercise of discretion," or maintenance or repair. Id. § 8-0105(5).
149. Id. § 8-0113 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994).
150. Id. §§ 8-0113(2)(b)-(c)(ii) (McKinney 1984).
151. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 617.12-.13 (1992).
152. Id. § 617.12.
153. Id. § 617.12(b).
154. Id. § 617.13.
155. Id. § 617.13(b).
156. In H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., the project in question was a new athletic

facility being built by Syracuse University with help from the state. 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 1979).
The defendants claimed that no impact statement was required since a domed stadium was not listed
as a Type I project. The court rejected this position and required environmental review, stating: "Like
the proverbial ostrich, respondents have incredibly put out of sight and mind a clear environmental
problem. By any assessment, the stadium is a major project .... Id. at 831. This case shows that an
action may require an EIS even though it is not listed as a Type I action.
Despite the fact that the regulations do not list all Type J actions, they remain useful for agencies
attempting to allocate their resources. For example, an agency may not have sufficient time or budgetary
resources to prepare an EIS for the particular Type I project it is contemplating. Rather than begin the
project and risk an injunction several months down the road, the agency could scale back the project
so as to avoid having to conduct the environmental review in the first place. The regulations also assist
the courts in determining whether an agency should have prepared an EIS. Listing those projects which
do and do not require impact analysis helps to standardize the application of SEQRA and furthers New
York's goal of forcing agencies to consider the environmental effects of major actions.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
158. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 1984).

1995]

9NDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

actions which may affect the environment as opposed to those which will
affect the environment. 5 9
Third, New York's statute also imposes additional substantive requirements.
Agencies must use all practicable means to further the policies and goals of
the Act and must mitigate or avoid adverse effects "to the maximum extent
practicable."' 60 This requirement brings a substantive element to environmental review. An agency must not only conduct a thorough, probing review
of the potential impacts of its decision, it must also act on the information
that this review yields. This substantive requirement is far bolder than the
requirements of NEPA, CEQA, and SEPA, yet it falls short of ensuring that
environmental factors are assigned a value equal to economic factors. The Act
mandates only that agencies act "to the maximum extent practicable" to
minimize or avoid adverse environmental impacts; it does not elevate
6
environmental factors over other considerations.' '
Fourth, the Act imposes an additional procedural hurdle upon agencies
before allowing them to approve environmentally harmful actions. Before an
agency may approve an action that has been the subject of an environmental
impact statement, it must make an explicit finding that environmental impacts
will be minimized or avoided to the maximum extent practicable. 62 Where
the agency believes an action's economic benefits outweigh its environmental
costs, SEQRA requires the agency to take steps to mitigate or avoid
environmental impact to the maximum extent practicable; if supported by
findings that such steps have been taken, approval of the action very likely
will not be reversed by the courts. Although SEQRA places high emphasis on
mitigating or avoiding environmental damage by government agencies, it does
not eliminate the possibility that such damage will occur.
Unlike CEQA and SEPA, SEQRA does not include any provisions
specifically addressing judicial review. New York's courts have responded by
developing standards for reviewing SEQRA decisions. These standards,
however, do not seem consistent with the broad goals of the statute. Although
the courts have acknowledged that SEQRA has a stronger substantive element
than NEPA, they have consistently held that SEQRA does not mandate any
particular result.
The leading case interpreting SEQRA's substantive role is Jackson v. New
York State Urban Development Corp.163 In Jackson, the court began by
observing that "SEQRA makes environmental protection a concern of every
159. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
160. The Act provides as follows:
Agencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and goals set forth in this
article, and shall act and choose alternatives which, consistent with social, economic and other
essential considerations, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize or avoid adverse
environmental effects, including effects revealed in the environmental impact statement process.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (McKinney 1984).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 8-0109(8) (McKinney 1984).
163. 494 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986).
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agency"'" and acknowledging that the Act is far more substantive than
NEPA.165 The court also noted SEQRA's requirement that agencies must act
in a manner which avoids or minimizes environmental impact to the maximum
extent practicable. 66 The court declined, however, to take a broad approach
to SEQRA and found that an agency's substantive obligations under the Act
must be viewed in light of a rule of reason. 67 Moreover, SEQRA left the
discretion to evaluate environmental impacts and choose
agencies with broad 68
among alternatives.
The court ultimately concluded that the role of the courts is to ensure
procedural and substantive compliance with SEQRA-not "to weigh the
desirability of any action or choose among alternatives."1 69 Therefore, the
court approved a two-part standard for judicial review of SEQRA decisions
by agencies. First, the reviewing court must examine the agency's actions and
ensure that those actions complied with SEQRA's procedural requirement.
Second, the court must review the record and determine whether the agency
"identified the relevant areas of environmental concerns, took a 'hard look'
at them, and made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination."'' 0 If the agency's decision meets this test, then its decision should be
upheld.
Ultimately, the Jackson test seems to fall short of SEQRA's requirements.
By permitting the agencies to determine what is and is not practicable, the
court diluted SEQRA's mandate that the agency make explicit findings that
the effects have been avoided or minimized "to the maximum extent practicable" before approving an action with potentially significant effects."'
The New York courts, however, are unlikely to abandon the Jackson test for
reviewing SEQRA decisions. In 1990, the court of appeals again used this
two-part test to validate an agency's decision.' 72 Nevertheless, the opinion
emphasized that a reviewing court must ensure that the agency has taken a

164. Id. at 434.
165. Id. As the court stated, "SEQRA is not merely a disclosure statute; it 'imposes far more "action
forcing" or "substantive" requirements on state and local decisionmakers than NEPA imposes on their
federal counterparts."' Id. (quoting Philip H. Gitlen, The Substantive Impact ofthe SEQRA, 46 ALB. L.
REv. 1241, 1248 (1982)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 436. "[A]n agency's substantive obligations under SEQRA must be viewed in light of a
rule of reason. 'Not every conceivable environmental impact, mitigating measure or alternative must be
identified and addressed before [an impact statement] will satisfy the substantive requirements of
SEQRA."' Id. (quoting Aldrich v. Pattison, 486 N.Y.S.2d 23, 29 (App. Div. 1985)).
168. Id. The court stated that "[n]othing in the law requires an agency to reach a particular result on
any issue, or permits the courts to second-guess the agency's choice, which can be annulled only if
arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 160. A better standard might entail allowing the court to review alternatives or
mitigation measures appearing in the record and to determine the practicability of the options rejected
by the agency. This would force agencies to evaluate other options more seriously and to bolster their
findings with deeply considered and strongly supported facts.
172. See Akpan v. Koch, 554 N.E.2d 53 (N.Y. 1990).
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hard look at the environmental issues.' 73 The tone of the opinion suggests
that if the environmental effects of an approved action are serious enough, the
court might be willing to find that the agency did not take a hard look at its
decision. This issue will certainly see additional litigation in the future, but
if the judicial development of CEQA and SEPA is any indication, it is
unlikely that the substantive provisions of SEQRA will receive a broad
application.
C. Summary of State Approaches
Though originally implemented to force federal agencies to consider the
environmental effects of their actions, NEPA's influence has spread far
beyond the national government. Perhaps its most significant contribution to
the environmental movement is its role as the model for the "Little NEPA"
statutes enacted by several states. These statutes have adopted NEPA's
procedures in an attempt to require their own state and local agencies to
consider environmental factors, and to value environmental protection as an
important role in their mandate.
California, Washington, and New York have enacted environmental
protection acts which combine NEPA's procedures with certain substantive
elements. These additional requirements may be considered in three groups.
First, the acts have a lower threshold for when environmental review is
required. California and New York require review whenever an action may
have significant environmental impact; 74 Washington requires review
whenever a more-than-moderate environmental effect may occur.' 75 The
courts recognize that the statutes' far-reaching policy statements require broad
application of the acts' substantive provisions. When the threshold for
environmental review is low, more state actions will receive environmental
consideration. After analyzing their actions and the effect those actions may
have, agencies become more likely to decide upon less damaging alternatives.
Second, the states have enacted provisions to clarify what actions are
covered by their statutes. The California and New York acts include
definitions of certain
essential terms, such as "action," "project," and
"environment." 76 Washington, on the other hand, has recognized certain
173. Id. at 58. The court stated:
Nevertheless, an agency, acting as a rational decision maker, must have conducted an

investigation and reasonably exercised its discretion so as to make a reasoned elaboration as
to the effect of a proposed action on a particular environmental concern. Thus, while a court

is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the agency on substantive matters, the court
must ensure that, in light of the circumstances of a particular case, the agency has given due

consideration to pertinent environmental factors. This determination is best made on a case-bycase basis and we need not and do not delineate the precise parameters of the hard look
doctrine beyond our holding here.

Id. (citation omitted).
174. See supra notes 98, 158-59 and accompanying text.

175. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 99-101, 145-49 and accompanying text.
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categorical exemptions which do not require environmental review.' New
York has also grouped its actions by type, establishing that certain actions
will require environmental review while others will not.' Ultimately, these
provisions give the legislature closer control over the statute's application.
These provisions also give the courts concrete terminology to use in
interpreting the statute. This encourages a consistent application of the statute
to actions within the legislature's intent.
Third, CEQA, SEPA, and SEQRA all impose additional substantive
constraints on the agency's decision. California requires agencies to mitigate
whenever feasible;
Washington gives agencies the substantive authority
to deny permits based on environmental considerations. 80 New York has
enacted several action-forcing provisions, one of which forbids agency
approval of an action unless the agency makes an express finding that
environmental impacts will be avoided to the maximum extent practicable."'
These provisions contain language that has no companion in NEPA. By
limiting agency discretion, the states intended for their statutes to be more
effective tools for environmental preservation.
State courts, however, have been unwilling to apply these statutes broadly.
Far-reaching initial interpretations are rescinded gradually as the courts try to
limit the scope of the statutes and their own roles in enforcing those
directives. The courts will nearly always defer to an agency's decision so long
as the agency has complied with the necessary procedures. This seems to
conflict with the strong mandates the state legislatures have used in their
policy acts, yet the trends are the same in California, Washington, and New
York. Environmental policy acts are perceived as procedural, and strong
statutory language would be required to convince courts otherwise. The courts
essentially assume that the agencies are capable of fulfilling the statutes'
mandates without judicial intervention.
If the trend under NEPA is any indication, then the effectiveness of "Little
NEPA's" may be threatened by lax judicial enforcement. Studies show that
fewer EIS's are prepared under NEPA today than were prepared ten years
ago, and fewer NEPA actions are filed in the courts. If this trend continues,
NEPA's procedural mandates will eventually be forgotten. If the state courts
continue in their present application of the state acts, CEQA, SEPA, and
SEQRA may not be far behind.
It is possible, however, to draft an environmental policy act which
encourages an active judicial role and fosters an environmental ethic in the
agencies. The following Part will examine Indiana's Environmental Policy Act
and consider why the statute has gone unenforced by the courts. The final Part
will consider how the Indiana statute may be strengthened through amendments taken from CEQA, SEPA, and SEQRA.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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II. THE INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Like California, Washington, and New York, Indiana has enacted its own
"Little NEPA" to apply to state projects.'8 2 This Part will discuss this
statute and evaluate its overall effectiveness. The first section will examine
the statutory language, noting how Indiana's Act differs from NEPA and the
other state environmental policy acts. The second section will consider
whether environmental citizen suits would be an effective means of ensuring
that agencies comply with the mandates of the Act. The third section will
consider whether an agency's failure to follow the Act could be challenged
under Indiana's Administrative Orders and Procedures Act. Ultimately, the
weak language of Indiana's Environmental Policy Act does little to protect the
state's environment from imprudent government decisions; only by substantially revising the statute may the General Assembly ensure that Indiana's
agencies will consider the environmental effects of their actions before those
actions are approved.
A. The Language of the Statute
Passed by the Indiana General Assembly in 1972,183 the Indiana Environmental Policy Act ("IEPA" or "the Act") requires environmental impact
statements for actions significantly affecting the environment. 8 4 Aside from
a few notable exceptions, IEPA employs the language of NEPA verbatim.
Like NEPA, IEPA contains no substantive element. Indiana's Act has also
generated far less litigation than its federal counterpart; in fact, there are no
reported decisions involving a challenge to an agency action for failure to
comply with IEPA.
Like NEPA, Indiana's statute begins with bold statements of purpose and
policy. 5 The Act states that its purposes include encouraging harmony
between people and the environment and eliminating damage to the environment and biosphere. 86 This language restates NEPA's purpose verbatim. 87 The policies behind IEPA are also copied directly from NEPA.8 8
These policies include assuring a safe and healthful environment for the
citizens of the state, attaining beneficial use of the environment without
89
degradation, and achieving a balance between population and resource use.'

182. 1972 Ind. Acts 98 (codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8).

183. Id.
184. Id. § 13-1-10-3. Unlike NEPA, CEQA, and the environmental policy acts of other states,
Indiana's Environmental Policy Act has never been interpreted or applied by the courts. The
abbreviation "IEPA" has been used in this Note as a shorthand consistent with scholarly writings about
these other statutes.
185. Id. §§ 13-1-10-1 to -2; see also supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
186. Id. § 13-1-10-1.
187. Compare IND. CODE § 13-1-10-1 with 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
188. Compare IND. CODE § 13-1-10-2 with 42 U.S.C. § 4331.
189. IND. CODE § 13-1-10-2.
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The motives of Indiana's General Assembly in enacting the environmental
policy act are not entirely clear. Unlike many states, Indiana does not publish
its legislative history; therefore, Indiana's courts are not able to rely upon
legislative intent in construing state law. Nevertheless, NEPA's history
provides valuable insight into the General Assembly's probable motives.
Although it should not be assumed that the legislatures' motives were
identical, the extreme similarity between the two statutes does suggest that
Indiana's General Assembly was concerned with the same issues and felt that
a state statute modeled after NEPA would be an effective means of addressing
those concerns. In this limited context, the remarks of the Senate in passing
NEPA are particularly useful for purposes of analyzing the General Assembly's probable motives as it enacted IEPA.
First, the Senate was concerned that environmental damage was accelerating, in large part due to governmental actions. 9 ' To offset this process,
NEPA stated the nation's goals for protecting its environment.' 9 ' Actionforcing measures were also included to ensure that the goals and principles
of the Act would not be ignored by the agencies. Second, the Senate also
noted the rising public concern over environmental matters. 92 Thus, as
NEPA's statement of purpose stated: "A primary purpose of the bill is to
restore public confidence in the Federal Government's capacity to achieve
important public purposes and objectives and at the same time to maintain and
enhance the quality of the environment."' 93
Although NEPA did set forth certain policy statements, the Senate also
explained that certain other concerns motivated the Congress to action.
Indiana's statute includes the same policy statements as NEPA. Thus, the
same policy considerations probably motivated the General Assembly.'94 It
is fair to assume that Indiana's legislature enacted IEPA to encourage government agencies to make environmentally responsible decisions and to increase
190. 115 CONG. REc. 19,010 (1969) (statement of Sen. Mansfield).
191. Id. at 19,009 (statement of Sen. Jackson) (The proposed act includes a "considered congressional
statement of national goals and purposes for the management and preservation of the quality of
America's future environment. The bill directs that all Federal agencies conduct their activities in
accordance with these goals, and provides 'action forcing' procedures to insure that these goals and

principles are observed.').

192. Id. at 19,010. ("Recent years have witnessed a growing public concern for the quality of the
environment and the manner in which it is managed.").

193. Id. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs added:
It is the Committee's belief that [NEPAl will also provide a model and a demonstration to
which State governments may look in their efforts to reorganize local institutions and to

establish local policies conducive to sound environmental management. This objective is of
great importance because many of the most serious environmental problems the Nation faces
are within the scope and, often, within the exclusive jurisdiction of State action and State
responsibility.
Id. (Excerpt from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Report on S. 1075)
194. It should be noted that at the time the General Assembly enacted IEPA, the United States
Supreme Court had not yet begun to limit NEPA's substantive application. Rather, the leading case on
NEPA's role in decision-making was Calvert Cliffs, which held agencies to the "hard look" standard.
See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. Under the law as it stood when IEPA was enacted,
NEPA-or a statute modeled after NEPA--seemed to require agencies to seriously scrutinize the impact
of their decisions and to make environmentally responsible decisions.
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public awareness of, and involvement in, these decisions. 95 It is equally fair
to judge the effectiveness of Indiana's statute by considering how effectively
it reaches these two broad goals.
As with the policy and purpose statements, Indiana's Act mirrors NEPA's
procedural requirements.' 96 Section 13-1-10-3 provides that all agencies of
the state must "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major state actions significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on
the environmental impact of the proposed action."' 97 The process under
9
IEPA is also very similar to NEPA.9'
First, the agency must determine
whether IEPA applies to the action it plans to take.' 99 Some actions are
specifically exempted by rules passed by the Water Pollution Control Board,
the Air Pollution Control Board, and the Solid Waste Management Board; 00
minor actions and emergency actions are also categorically exempt.20 ' If the
action is not exempt, the second step under IEPA is to determine whether the
...

action will significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The
impact of some actions may be obvious; where significance is less certain, the
agency should prepare an environmental assessment form to assist in making

the determination. 2 2 If this form leads the agency to conclude that no
significant environmental effects will result from the action, then the agency
195. Although not enacted by the legislature, the rules promulgated by the state's water and air
pollution control boards do address the purpose of environmental impact statements and support the
conclusion that the General Assembly acted to promote responsible decisions and public awareness.
These rules provide:
The purpose of an environmental impact statement is to relate environmental considerations
to the inception of the planning process, to examine alternative means of achieving the
intended purpose of the proposed action, to inform the public and other public agencies as
early as possible about proposed actions that may significantly affect the quality of the
environment, and to solicit comments which will assist the agency in the decision-making
process in determining the environmental consequences of the proposed action.
IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 326, r. 16-2-3(b)(1) (1992); see also id. tit. 327, r. 11-2-3(b)(1).
196. Compare IND. CODE § 13-1-10-3 with 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
197. IND. CODE § 13-1-l0-3(2)(C)(i).
198. See supra note 42.

199. The Act required the Air Pollution Control Board, the Water Pollution Control Board, and the
Solid Waste Management Board to define, by rule, "which actions constitute a major state action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." IND. CODE § 13-1-10-3(2)(C). Under this
statutory authority, these three boards have enacted rules governing IEPA's application. See IND. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 326, r. 16-1-1 to -2-3 (1992) (Air Pollution Control Board); id. tit. 327, r. 11-1-I to -2-3
(Water Pollution Control Board); id tit. 329, r. 5-1-1 to -2-3 (Solid Waste Management Board).
However, these rules provide little guidance for determining whether an action is significant. In fact,
the applicable rule of each board states that "[ilt is not within the scope of this rule to identify before
the fact which major state agency actions significantly affect the quality of the human environment."
Id. tit. 326, r. 16-1-4(a) (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-1-4(a); id. tit. 329, r. 5-14(a). The rules do identify
that actions include (but are not limited to) legislative proposals by agencies, new or continuing projects
undertaken or supported by the agencies, and the making of rules. Id. tit. 326, r. 16-1-3(d); id. tit. 327,
r. 11-1-3(d); id. tit. 329, r. 5-1-3(d). Nonetheless, the rules leave significance to be determined on a caseby-case basis.
200. IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 326, r. 16-1-3(e) (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-1-3(e); id. tit. 329, r. 5-1-3(e).
201. Id. tit 326, r. 16-1-3(f) (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-1-3(f); id. tit. 329, r. 5-1-3(f).
202. Id. tit. 326, r. 16-1-5 (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-1-5; id. tit. 329, r. 5-1-5.
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may issue a statement to that effect; 20 3 otherwise, the agency should prepare
an environmental impact statement. This statement's content is established by
the statute 2° and the accompanying rules. 20 ' As with NEPA, however,
once the agency has prepared its decision, its requirements under IEPA are
met. The Act does not mandate any substantive result, nor does it require
mitigation or adoption of a less environmentally damaging alternative.
In the procedures it mandates, IEPA is very similar to the statutes of
California, New York, and Washington. 6 However, Indiana drafted its
statute far more narrowly than these other states. This narrow construction has
severely limited IEPA's effectiveness and probably explains why plaintiffs
have not challenged agencies for failing to comply with IEPA's procedures.
First, and perhaps most importantly, IEPA applies only to a limited range
of actions. The Act itself provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
construed to require an environmental impact statement for the issuance of a
license or permit by any agency of the state. 2 °7 This provision drastically
limits IEPA's scope, for the Act applies only to actions directly undertaken
by government agencies. Neither NEPA nor any of its other progeny were
drafted so narrowly. In fact, where state legislatures failed to include any
mention of permits or licenses, state courts have still required environmental
impact statements from the permitting agencies, holding that to require
otherwise would contravene the purposes and policies behind the acts. 2 8
Washington, for example, not only requires environmental review of actions
permitted by agencies but also grants the agency the substantive authority to
deny the permit based on the findings of that review.20 9 As California's
supreme court has noted, the broad purposes of environmental policy acts
suggest that the Act should be applied to permits and licenses. 21 0 Thus, by
providing that IEPA would not apply to permits and licenses, the General
Assembly severely limited the scope and effectiveness of the Act.
Indiana limits IEPA's scope in another significant manner. Environmental
impact review is required only for the actions of state agencies. 2" The
regulations enacted by the water and air pollution control boards define state
agencies to include bodies created and funded by the state. 2 2 These regulations explicitly provide that "[I]ocal government units at the town, city,

203. Id. tit. 326, r. 16-1-5 (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-1-5; id. tit. 329, r. 5-1-5.
204. IND. CODE § 13-1-10-3(C).
205. IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 326, r. 16-2-3(b)(2) (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-2-3(b)(2); id. tit. 329, r. 52-3(b)(2).
206. See supra text following note 92.
207. IND. CODE § 13-1-10-6.
208. See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972); Polygon
Corp. v. City of Seattle, 578 P.2d 1309 (Wash. 1978).
209. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
210. Friends of Mammoth, 502 P.2d at 1056.
211. See IND. CODE § 13-1-10-3(2) ("[A]II agencies of the state shall . . .
212. The regulations define state agencies, departments, or institutions to include "any department,
board, commission, bureau, or council created by the legislature having statewide jurisdiction, the
operation of which is financed from appropriations of the general assembly." IND. ADMiN. CODE tit. 326,
r. 16-2-2 (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-2-2; id. tit. 329, r. 5-2-2.
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township, or county level are not included." 213 With this simple provision,
the rules exclude a wide range of actions, including city construction projects,
construction and maintenance of local roads, and all zoning decisions.214 In
enacting NEPA, the U.S. Senate recognized the significance of local actions.
The Act was intended not only to affect the decisions of federal agencies but
also to give "a model and a demonstration to which State governments may
look in their efforts to reorganize local institutions and to establish local
policies conducive to sound environmental management." 215 California, New
York, and Washington all explicitly provide that their acts apply to local
agencies. 216 By excluding local actions, the Indiana General Assembly
ignored a large range of actions and seriously limited IEPA's mandate.
A second way in which IEPA differs from the other state acts is that
Indiana's Act does not include a substantive element. California and New
York express a preference for environmentally responsible decisions. Agencies
are required to mitigate or adopt less damaging alternatives-or at least to
issue explicit findings of the reasons for choosing not to do so. 2"7 Like
NEPA, IEPA requires only the preparation of an environmental impact
statement. Once a statement is prepared to accompany the proposal, the
agency has met its IEPA obligations. The Supreme Court's gradual limitation
of NEPA's substantive element has had an adverse effect on NEPA's
procedural role. 2 8 Without a substantive element, IEPA cannot be expected
to fare any better.
A third difference between IEPA and the other state statutes is that IEPA
does not provide a standard for judicial review. This is not particularly
surprising since IEPA was modeled after NEPA, which also contains no
mention of judicial review. However, since Congress failed to include a
standard for the courts to use when reviewing agency actions under NEPA,
the courts were left to determine how those actions should be examined. The
Supreme Court has mandated an extremely deferential approach to NEPA. 2, 9
Under the Court's recent NEPA holdings, a reviewing court should consider
whether the agency has met NEPA's procedural requirements; if these
requirements are met, then the court should defer to the agency's judgment.22o

213. Id. tit. 326, r. 16-2-2 (1992); id. tit. 327, r. 11-2-2; id. tit. 329, r. 5-2-2.

214. When a state's environmental policy act applies to local actions, it "will apply to land use
decisions such as rezonings, general plans, planned unit developments, and approvals of subdivision
maps. Disputes over these types of decisions have resulted in a large portion of the [state environmental
policy act] case law." SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 11, at 10-5.
215. 115 CONG. RPc. 19,010 (1969) (Excerpt from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Report
on S.1075).
216. CAL. PuB. RES.CODE § 21151; N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(3); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 43.21C.030. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(2) (1993) (exempting the Department of

Public Services Regulation in certain circumstances).
217, CAL. PuB. RES.CODE § 21002.1(b); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1).
218. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.

219, See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
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By contrast, Washington and California explicitly provided for judicial
review in their statutes. Yet both of these states employ standards which are
also deferential to the agency's decision. California differentiates between
actions based upon whether a hearing was held; however, both types of action
receive essentially the same level of review. If there is substantial evidence
to support the decision, it will be upheld by California's courts.2 2' Washington's courts also222grant substantial weight to agency decisions and defer to
those decisions.
For judicial review to be valuable under an environmental policy act, it
must be meaningful review. Judges should not be relegated to "the essentially
mindless task" of determining whether an impact statement accompanied the
proposal-especially if the agency may ignore the statement's findings in
reaching its decision.223 Instead, a standard of judicial review should help
the courts to implement the act's policy. The goals of the statute should be
carefully considered in deciding how closely an agency's decision should be
scrutinized.
Specifying the standard of review will have no effect unless plaintiffs
challenging the agency's decision have recourse to the courts. If the court
cannot hear the case, no level of judicial scrutiny will make a difference.
Therefore, the remainder of this Part considers whether Indiana plaintiffs can
bring environmental matters to the court's attention through the Indiana
Environmental Protection Act or the Administrative Orders and Procedures
Act. As we shall see, these statutes fail to ensure judicial redress of a claim
that an agency violated IEPA.
B. Using Environmental Citizen Suits to Enforce 1EPA
Since IEPA offers no methods for challenging an agency's decision, other
avenues for challenging the agency's decision must be explored. One option
may be the Indiana Environmental Protection Act ("Protection Act").224
Under the Protection Act, any individual or legal entity may sue an alleged
polluter, regardless of whether the plaintiff is harmed by the polluter's
activity. 225 This provision may be applicable to IEPA violations. If, for

221. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
223. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying
note 69.
224. IND. CODE §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (1993).
225. The Protection Act provides that the attorney general, a government entity, a citizen of Indiana,
or a business maintaining an office in Indiana:
may bring an action for declaratory and equitable relief in the name of the state against an
individual, a partnership, a copartnership, a firm, a company, a corporation, a limited liability
company, an association, a joint stock company, a trust, an estate, a state agency, or an officer,
a city, a town, a county, or a local governmental unit, an agency, or an official, or any other
legal entity or their legal representative, agent, or assigns, for the protection of the environment
of Indiana from significant pollution, impairment, or destruction. A citizen, a partnership, a
corporation, a limited liability company, an association, or a public officer or agency, as a
condition precedent to maintaining an action, must give notice in writing by registered or
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example, an agency failed to prepare an impact statement for a project which
would pollute an area, a plaintiff would be able to sue that agency to have the
action enjoined until an impact statement is filed.
There are numerous problems with using the Protection Act to enforce
IEPA. First, the Protection Act does not define its terms. There is no
indication of how broadly the term "environment" should be defined, for
example, nor does the Act clarify what level of pollution is "significant"
enough to warrant protection. In the few cases where the Protection Act has
been invoked,226 it has been construed narrowly.227 In the one case
discussing the statute's language, the court determined that although the Act
"accords standing to bring an action, it does so under limited circumstances.
The general tenor of its provisions is restrictive and an action thereunder is
,,228
The court's
not permitted unless an agency fails to hold a hearing ....
conclusion that the Act applies only under limited circumstances "can only be
interpreted as an effort to deter use of the statute, contrary to what the
legislature must have intended when enacting [the Protection Act]. 229
Consequently, a court would be unlikely to approve the statute's use in new
and innovative ways-such as bringing a claim under IEPA. By narrowly
construing the statute's vague terms (such as "environment" and "significantly"), the court could continue to constrict the Protection Act's scope and
would preclude its use in enforcing IEPA.
The greatest drawbacks to using the Protection Act to challenge agency
actions under the IEPA are not the provisions excluded by the Act but the
limitations included in the Act. For example, before getting a day in court, a
plaintiff invoking the Protection Act must exhaust all available administrative
remedies. 230 The Act gives the agency ninety days from the time it receives

certified

mail

to the department of natural resources, the department of environmental

management, and the attorney general, who shall promptly notify all state administrative
agencies having jurisdiction over or control of the pollution, impairment, destruction, or
protection of the environment for which relief is sought.
Id. § 13-6-1-1(a).

226. Few Indiana cases have cited the Protection Act. Those which have cited the Act include:
Indiana ex rel. Prosser v. Indiana Waste Systems, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Sekerez
v. United States Reduction Co., 344 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet
&Tube Co., 337 N.E.2d 521 (Ind.Ct. App. 1975); and Sekerez v. United States Steel Corp., 316 N.E.2d
413 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
227. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 337 N.E.2d 521.
228. Id. at 525.
229. Mary J.Rhoades, Note, The Indiana Environmintal Protection Act: An Environmentalist's
Weapon in Need of Repair,22 VAL. U. L. REV. 149, 167-68 (1987) ("Consequently, the [Protection
Act's] objective of improving the environment through the citizenry is violated and legislative will is
frustrated.') Id. at 168.
230. "In Indiana, environmental litigation is restricted to a limited set of circumstances-potential
plaintiffs are precluded from the courts unless they fully exhaust administrative remedies." Id. at 163
n.67 (citing Joseph F. DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process:
EmpiricalFindings,RemainingIssues and a DirectionforFutureResearch, 1977 DuKE L.J. 409,412).
By contrast, a plaintiff under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act has direct standing before
the court and need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1204(1) (West 1987).
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"
notice to take action to eliminate the pollution.23
' If during this time the
agency initiates a hearing or criminal proceeding, then the plaintiff's cause of
action cannot be maintained.232 Plaintiffs' reluctance to file claims under the
Protection Act may be caused in part by this provision.233 Imposing a
mandatory waiting period takes control over the action away from the
plaintiff, which discourages individuals and groups from filing claims under
the Protection Act.
The statute's effectiveness is also limited by the low burden of proof the
defendant must sustain. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that
the defendant's conduct has impaired or polluted the environment of the State
(or is likely to do so), the defendant has two ways to rebut the prima facie
case.234 The defendant may show compliance with the applicable state
standards,235 or, if there is no applicable rule, the defendant may show that
there is no feasible or prudent alternative and that the action is consistent with
the State's concern for the environment. 36 This provision is troubling in
light of the court's narrow application of the Protection Act. In Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, the court took the position that the Protection Act was to be
used only under limited circumstances; therefore, it interpreted the statute's
language narrowly. 3 Consistent with that approach, a court could interpret
the terms "feasible and prudent" narrowly and allow more defendants to
defeat these troublesome citizen suits.
Based upon the Protection Act's narrow interpretation, procedural
requirements, and strict timing provisions, the Act would not be a powerful
weapon for challenging an agency's actions as violative of the IEPA. Even if
the action which was the subject of the impact statement polluted the
environment, the ease with which the agency could escape liability turns the
Protection Act into a paper tiger. For IEPA to receive meaningful consideration from the courts, an alternative method for challenging the agency's
determination must be developed.

231. IND. CODE § 13-6-1-1(b)(1).
232. Id. § 13-6-1-1(b).
233. As one commentator has stated:
The legislature unnecessarily restricted the statute by requiring a plaintiff to exhaust all

administrative remedies before gaining access to the courts. This inconvenience alone has been
cited as one reason Indiana citizens do not use [the Protection Act]... . [T]his procedure
effectively precludes citizens from playing an active role in the environmental decision-making
process.. . .While an agency is considering the case, the concerned citizen is merely a passive
amicus.
Rhoades, supra note 229, at 166 (footnotes omitted).
234. IND. CODE § 13-6-1-2(a).
235. Id. § 13-6-1-2(a)(1).
236. Id. § 13-6-1-2(a)(2).
237. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
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C. The Administrative Orders and ProceduresAct
The Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act 231 ("IAOPA")
offers another method of challenging an agency's procedures in court under
IEPA. IAOPA establishes the conditions under which judicial review will be
allowed and the degree of scrutiny which the action will receive. Although
this statute would allow the courts to consider whether an agency had met its
obligations under IEPA, the procedures specified in IAOPA are too stringent
for the Act to be a viable means of enforcing IEPA.
Indiana courts have recognized that the right to judicial review is guaranteed
by the Constitution. Due process and the separation of powers doctrine
demand that an agency's decisions be subject to scrutiny by the courts.239
Nevertheless, this right has definite limits. For example, the court must first
determine whether the agency acted within its jurisdiction.240 The court may
also consider whether the agency's determination accords with the law and is
supported by substantial evidence. 24' The right to judicial review is not
revoked simply because the legislature failed to provide for judicial review in
a statute; 242 however, there may be additional procedural requirements
imposed before an agency's decision may be challenged before the court.
In Indiana, the procedures a plaintiff must follow in order to challenge the
agency's decisions are established in IAOPA.243 To obtain review of a final
agency action, the plaintiff must show standing, exhaust all administrative
remedies, and meet certain timing requirements. 244 Thus, IAOPA achieves
its twin purposes: it provides for judicial review, yet also narrows the right
to more limited sets of circumstances.2 45
The standing requirement is relatively easy to satisfy. Under IAOPA, a
person has standing to obtain judicial review of an agency action if the action
is specifically addressed against him, if he was a party to the agency
proceedings leading up to the action, or if he was "otherwise aggrieved or
238. IND. CODE §§ 4-21.5-5-1 to -16 (1993). This Act is also occasionally referred to as the
"Administrative Adjudication Act."
239. Mathis v. Cooperative Vefndors, Inc., 354 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
240. City of Indianapolis v. Nickel, 331 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ind.Ct. App. 1975).
241. Id.

242. City of Plymouth v. Stream Pollution Control Bd., 151 N.E.2d 626, 628 n.3 (Ind. 1958).
243. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-2.
244. The Act provides that:
(b) Only a person who qualifies under:
(1) section 3 of this chapter concerning standing;
(2) section 4 of this chapter concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies;
(3) section 5 of this chapter concerning the time for filing a petition for review;
(4) section 13 of this chapter concerning the time for filing the agency record for review;
and
(5) any other statute that sets conditions for the availability of judicial review; is entitled
to review of a final agency action.
Id. § 4-21.5-5-2(b).

245. "The purpose of the Administrative Adjudication Act ...is to provide for a scope of review
of administrative actions; thus, at the same time limiting judicial review of such action." Indiana
Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Lamb, 267 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ind. 1971).
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adversely affected by the agency action. 246 These provisions basically
require the plaintiff to show that he "has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining a direct injury" as a result of the agency action.247 It is not
enough for the plaintiff to show an injury "common to all members of the
'
public."248
As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, however, an
organization whose members were injured by an administrative action has
standing to represent those members before the court and to challenge the
agency's decision. 2 49 Given that a significant amount of environmental
litigation is initiated by private organizations, the standing of those groups to
challenge the agency in court is particularly important in the context of IEPA.
Before a judicial challenge to an agency action may be raised, all administrative remedies generally must be exhausted.250 If the plaintiff fails to
exhaust the available administrative remedies, then the court must dismiss the
complaint. 251' The Indiana Supreme Court has suggested, however, that this
rule should not be applied "mechanistically. '25 2 Instead, various equitable
factors should be considered in determining whether to allow the plaintiff to
bypass administrative channels. These factors include the character of the
question presented, the nature of the question (whether one of law or fact), the
adequacy of the administrative channels for addressing the question, the harm
to the plaintiff of going through those channels, and the disruptive effect of
judicial intervention.253
Under IEPA, if an action were challenged by an individual, administrative
remedies would be available and would have to be exhausted before a court
could hear the controversy.
The plaintiff and the agency would present
their arguments before an administrative law judge, who would hear the
evidence and issue a ruling. 255 At this hearing, the agency would present its
EIS (or its data supporting a determination that an EIS was not necessary),
and this information, along with any other evidence submitted by the agency

246. The Act provides:
(a) The following persons have standing to obtain judicial review of an agency action:
(1) A person to whom the agency action is specifically directed.
(2) A person who was a party to the agency proceedings that led to the agency action.
(3) A person eligible for standing under a law applicable to the agency action.
(4) A person otherwise aggrieved or adversely affected by the agency action.
IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-3(a).
247. Terre Haute Gas Corp. v. Johnson, 45 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind. 1942).

248. Id.

249. United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1972) ("It is noteworthy,
however, that for purposes of standing '. . . an organization whose members are injured may represent
those members in a proceeding for judicial review.' . . . This is especially true when representation of
the interests involved is the primary reason for the organization's existence.") (omissions in original)
(citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
250. "A person may file a petition for judicial review under this chapter only after exhausting all

administrative remedies available within the agency whose action is being challenged and within any
other agency authorized to exercise administrative review." IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-4(a).
251. Rambo v. Cohen, 587 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
252. Wilson v. Board of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 385 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind. 1979).

253. Id.
254. Penrod Interview, supra note 19.
255. Id.
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or the defendant, will make up the record which would later be reviewed by
a court. Once the final order is entered by the administrative law judge, the
aggrieved party has a limited right to judicial review.256 Only evidence from
the record may be reviewed,2 7 however, and a party must be part of the
administrative adjudication in order to have any right to judicial review
later. 5 8
To meet IAOPA's requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted,
a plaintiff challenging an agency's decision under IEPA would need to initiate
these administrative procedures. Considering the narrow interpretation the
Indiana courts have given to the Protection Act, 2 9 it is unlikely that those
same courts would ignore IAOPA's requirements and allow IEPA plaintiffs
to proceed to court without first requiring them to pursue administrative relief.
Once standing has been demonstrated, administrative remedies exhausted,
and all notice requirements met, the plaintiffs may present their arguments to
the court for review. The standards of judicial review, as established by
IAOPA, are extremely limited. 26 ' A court may not conduct de novo review
or "substitute its judgment for that of the agency." 26' Rather, a reviewing
court may consider only whether the agency's action is arbitrary, capricious,
or not in accordance with law; contrary to the Constitution, a statute, or
required procedures; or unsupported by substantial evidence.262 Judicial
review has been limited to these narrow circumstances because "Indiana, like
other jurisdictions, recognizes the need for unfettered action by administrative
'
agencies operating within the sphere of their authority."263
Ultimately, the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is
limited to consideration of whether there was substantial evidence to support
the decision or whether the action was arbitrary and capricious .2 " To be
arbitrary and capricious, a decision must be "willful and unreasonable, without

256. Id.
257. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-11.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
260. See City of Indianapolis v. Ingram, 377 N.E.2d 877, 883 (Ind.Ct. App. 1978).
261. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-11.
262. The Act provides as follows:
(a) The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party to the judicial

review proceeding asserting invalidity.
(b) The validity of agency action shall be determined in accordance with the standards of
review provided in this section, as applied to the agency action at the time it was taken.
(c) The court shall make findings of fact on each material issue on which the court's decision
is based.
(d)The court shall grant relief under section 15 of this chapter only if it determines that a
person seeking judicial relief has been prejudiced by an agency action that is:
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence.
Id. § 4-21.5-5-14.
263. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. McShane, 354 N.E.2d 259, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
264. Ingram, 377 N.E.2d at 883.

INDINA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:613

consideration and in disregard of the facts or circumstances in the case. '
The court will reverse an agency action as arbitrary and capricious only "if
the evidence, when viewed as a whole, establishes that the agency's
' The substantial evidence standard
conclusions are clearly erroneous."266
has

been described in very similar language: "Under the substantial evidence
standard, the reviewing court must consider the record as a whole ... . A
court may vacate a ... decision only if the evidence, when viewed as a
whole, demonstrates that the conclusions reached ... are clearly erro'
neous."267
Substantial evidence exists where a reasonable person would
believe the evidence is sufficient to support the agency's decision. 26" The
Indiana Supreme Court has acknowledged the overlap between these two tests:
"Recognizing the absence of significant differences between the 'arbitrary and
capricious' test and the 'unsupported by substintial evidence' standard, this
Court recently declared that the 'substantial evidence' standard should be

applied when reviewing the evidentiary support for an administrative
decision. 269
In some cases, review under the substantial evidence standard might meet
IEPA's objectives. The General Assembly's motives for enacting IEPA were

to encourage environmentally conscious decision-making and to allow public
involvement in these decisions. If the agency holds a hearing, the public will
be allowed to express its concerns about the action. This process would also

inform the agency of any additional environmental issues surrounding the
project. By responding to these issues in the record, the agency would have
considered and rejected the environmental arguments, but the decision would
have been environmentally conscious. If the court took the whole record into
account in determining whether the decision was supported by substantial
evidence, then the statute's goals would be met.
In sum, although an agency's decisions under the state environmental policy
act could potentially be challenged through IAOPA, certain conditions must

265. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Philco-Ford Corp., 356 N.E.2d 1379, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
266. Indiana Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 592 N.E.2d 714, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). "An
arbitrary and capricious act is one which is... without some basis which would lead a reasonable and
honest person to the same conclusion." Id.
267. Stewart v. Fort Wayne Community Schs., 564 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 1990). Earlier in its
opinion, the court acknowledged the overlap between the "substantial evidence" standard and the
"arbitrary and capricious" test, noting that "[w]hatever differences exist between the two tests create
more confusion than they are worth." Id. at 277. The court went on to note:
The leading scholar on administrative law, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, has stated that no
other area of administrative law is in more need of general reform than the common law of the
state courts concerning standards ofjudicial review .... Davis noted in his most recent treatise
on the subject that the best way to reform this area of the law would be to simplify the
standards. "Everyone should learn from the experience of the past quarter of a century that
refining the verbalisms about scope or review is not merely unprofitable but harmful."
Id. at 277 n.3 (quoting KENNETH C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:7 at 363 (2d ed.
1984) (footnote omitted) (omission in original)).
268. "If a reasonable person would conclude that the evidence and the logical and reasonable
inferences therefrom are of such a substantial character and probative value so as to support the
administrative determination, then the substantial evidence standard of I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14(d)(5) is met."
Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Weingart, Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1288, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
269. City of Indianapolis v. Hargis, 588 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind. 1992).
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first be met. The most difficult of these conditions are showing standing and
proving that there are no administrative remedies available. Once these
conditions are met, the plaintiff may have recourse to the courts, but judicial
review may not satisfy the purposes of IEPA. Ultimately, the courts will apply
a substantial evidence standard of review and defer to the agency if any
evidence supports the ruling. This fulfills IEPA's objectives if the agency has
in fact held a hearing, for the environmental issues will have been discussed
and the public informed. If the agency has not held a hearing, then substantial
evidence review short circuits the policies behind the Act. To ensure that
IEPA's goals are met, standards of review should be developed to ensure that
an agency considers the environmental effects of its action and allows the
public to have a voice in the decision.
III. RESHAPING THE INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Indiana's Environmental Policy Act falls woefully short of meeting its
stated purposes for three principal reasons. First, because the Act does not
apply to actions permitted by state agencies, many environmentally significant
actions slip through the cracks of the statute. Second, because the Act does
not define its terminology, agencies and the public are uncertain of when the
statute's provisions are triggered. Third, by omitting any mention of judicial
review, the Act loses a valuable means of enforcement which could ensure
that the Act's mandates are fulfilled. By amending IEPA to alleviate these
shortcomings, the General Assembly could ensure that agencies take
environmental factors into account and involve the public in the decisionmaking process.
A. Requiring Review for State Permits and Licenses
The General Assembly should amend IEPA to require impact statements
before state permits or licenses are granted. By excluding permits and licenses
from the Act's reach,. the General Assembly severely limited IEPA's
scope.2 10 The Act may be applied only to projects undertaken or approved
by government agencies. This limitation is unique to IEPA. Other states'
policy acts specifically require environmental impact statements for all actions
before a permit or license is issued.2n Where the legislature failed to
specify whether the act applies to permits and licenses, the courts of those
states have had little difficulty holding that impact statements should be
prepared for such actions.272 In construing the act, those courts have
examined the statements of policy and purpose. These provisions outline the
broad goals of the act, goals which will be advanced by requiring agencies to
270. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100; N.Y.
CODE ANN. § 43.21C.060.
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272. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.

§ 8-0105(4); WASH REv.
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conduct environmental review before permitting or licensing actions which
may have a significant impact on the environment.273
Allowing agencies to permit or license such activities without carefully
considering the environmental impact runs directly counter to the purposes of
IEPA.274 State agencies may still make decisions which are environmentally
irresponsible, for they will not have all relevant environmental data before
them when they grant the permit or license. If the impact statement were
prepared, the agency might make the same decision; however, that decision
would be an informed one. The statute's goal is to encourage agencies to get
the facts before committing the state to a course of action which could
damage the environment.275 Permitting or licensing a private action is no
less a commitment than expending state funds; a privately funded activity may
significantly affect the environment and should therefore be given the same
measure of consideration as if the state were taking the action itself.
Granting permits and licenses without first considering the environmental
impact also ignores IEPA's other purpose: facilitating public involvement in
agency decisions.2 76 A construction project approved by the state, for
example, might kill the fish in a nearby stream, thus affecting a community's
livelihood. Alternatively, the traffic patterns in the area might increase,
disturbing a nearby wildlife refuge. These effects are local, yet they may
reach the point of significance. They are exactly the type of factors an EIS
should discuss, for an agency might fail to consider these types of factors
unless an EIS is prepared. Requiring environmental review before such actions
are permitted ensures that the effects will be brought to the agency's attention
and allows the public an opportunity to express its opposition before a
commitment is made. This clearly advances the purposes underlying IEPA.
Therefore, the General Assembly should repeal Section 13-1-10-6 of IEPA,
the section which excludes actions permitted or licensed by the state from
environmental review.
B. Clarifying and Expanding the Scope of the Act
The General Assembly should also amend IEPA to clarify and expand its
scope. One of the major problems with the Act is that agencies do not know
when impact statements are required. It is not clear, for example, what actions
are covered or when those actions reach the point of "significantly" impacting
natural resources. These ambiguities should be addressed in the statute to help
minimize further uncertainty. At the same time, the Act's scope should be
expanded. Other states have encountered greater success with their policy acts
because they require environmental review of a larger variety of projects. By

273. See
274. See
275. See
276. See

supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 86.
supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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lowering the threshold for requiring an EIS, Indiana would advance its goal
of forcing agencies to think about the environment when making a decision.
Three amendments to IEPA should be passed. First, the threshold for
requiring environmental review should be lowered. Congress chose to require
environmental review of "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." 77 Indiana chose to adopt the same
approach. 7 8 Other states have lower thresholds. Both California and New
York require environmental review of actions which may affect environmental
quality. 9 Washington provides that environmental review is necessary
whenever a more-than-moderate effect on the environment is a reasonable
probability."' These requirements recognize that a low threshold for the
procedural requirements increases the likelihood that agencies will have the
necessary environmental data before them when they make their decisions.
The General Assembly should amend Section 13-1-10-3(C) to require an
environmental impact statement for all actions which may have a significant
impact on the quality of the human environment. Such an amendment would
substantially advance the purposes of IEPA.
Second, IEPA should be amended to include definitions of its major terms.
"
' These
California and New York define certain terms in their acts.28
provisions give the legislatures greater control over the scope of the statutes.
Among its definitions, IEPA should define "environment" and "action." The
scope of the definition of "environment" determines the scope of the Act. For
most areas of Indiana, "environment" need only include effects on natural
resources;282 however, in more densely populated areas such as Indianapolis,
Fort Wayne, and Gary, the definition would be more effective if it included
effects on neighborhoods and communities. 283 To meet the needs of rural
and urban communities, Indiana should adopt New York's definition and
define "environment" to include "the physical conditions which will be
affected by a proposed action, including land, air, water, minerals, flora,
fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance, existing patterns of
population concentration, distribution or growth, and existing community or
neighborhood character."' " By adopting this definition, the General
Assembly could ensure that IEPA's provisions would be applied to urban and
.rural projects.
Another term which should be defined by IEPA is "action." New York's
definition of "action" clarifies the types of government projects which require

277. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
278. IND. CODE § 13-1-10-3(C).
279. CAL PUB. RFs. CODE § 21100; N.Y. ENVTm. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2).
280. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 552 P.2d 674, 680

(Wash. 1976) (en bane).
281. See supra notes 99-101, 145-48 and accompanying text.
282. For these areas, California's definition would be adequate. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
283. For these areas, New York's ,definition would be more useful. See supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
284. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0105(6).
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environmental review. 285 By establishing that "actions" include projects
directly undertaken by agencies, projects funded by agencies, or projects
permitted by agencies, the General Assembly would inform agencies when
environmental impact statements are required. Also, New York's statute
groups actions by type-certain types require impact statements while others
do not. 286 The regulations interpreting IEPA fail to make such a distinction.28 7 Either the regulations or the statute should be amended to establish
which actions require impact statements. While these lists need not be
exhaustive, they should be relatively thorough to provide guidance to the
agencies and to the courts.
Third, a substantive limitation should be imposed on the agencies. New
York requires its agencies to minimize the action's adverse environmental
effects, to adopt alternative measures with less significant effects, or to make
findings that such measures are not practicable. 288 This requirement not only
forces an agency to give serious consideration to the impact its decision will
have on the environment, but also ensures that the agency will examine
whether that impact may be avoided. Imposing this requirement would not
eliminate the agency's discretion, for the agency could still adopt a plan with
adverse effects on the environment. Before it could do so, however, the
agency would be forced to make findings that alternatives or other mitigating
measures are not practicable. These findings would later be subject to judicial
scrutiny. If the court did not agree with the findings, it could then remand the
matter to the agency. Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the decision,
imposing a findings requirement gives the court a record to review and forces
agencies to consider other options that have a less significant impact. Because
such a requirement would further the objectives of IEPA, the General
Assembly should amend the Act to require agencies to adopt less environnentally damaging alternatives or to mitigate the impact of its decision to the
maximum extent practicable and to require explicit findings to that same
effect.
C. Allowing Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
Although judicial review of an agency's decision under IEPA might be
possible under the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, 28 9 the
purposes and intent of IEPA would be better advanced if IEPA were amended
to allow plaintiffs direct access to the courts. Providing such access would not
be unusual. In fact, a federal agency's decision under NEPA "is treated as an
example of informal agency decision making subject to direct review in the

285. Id. § 8-0105(4).
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 199.
See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
See supra part II.C.
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federal district courts."2' 9 California and Washington's statutes also
authorize judicial review of the agencies' actions under their state environmental policy acts.29
The question which remains is what level of judicial scrutiny should be
applied to these decisions. Indiana's supreme court has determined that the
substantial evidence standard should be applied by courts reviewing an
agency's decision.292 Applying this standard would encourage agencies to
fulfill their obligations under IEPA and would therefore further the purposes
of the statute. Under the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court
considers the record as a whole, examining the evidence that supports the
agency's decision and the evidence opposing the decision; the court may
reverse the agency's decision only if the evidence demonstrates that the
conclusion of the agency was clearly erroneous.293 Substantial evidence
exists when a reasonable person would believe the evidence sufficient to
support the agency's decision.294
Providing judicial review of agency decisions under IEPA has distinct
advantages. First, once agencies realize that their decisions may be reversed
by the courts, they will begin to take their role under IEPA more seriously.
Since these decisions must be supported by substantial evidence, agencies will
work harder to assemble the evidence necessary to ensure that their decisions
will not be reversed. This will encourage agencies to hold hearings and to
produce a record that can withstand judicial review, thereby furthering the
statute's goal of forcing agencies to seriously consider the environmental
impact of its decisions.
In addition, establishing the standard of review in the statute itself would
clarify the role of the courts in the decision. At first blush, it may not appear
necessary to explicitly provide that the agency's decision under IEPA will be
reviewed by the courts under the substantial evidence standard, since the
courts generally review agency decisions under this standard. Nevertheless,
the vast body of case law under the environmental policy acts of other states
illustrates how the courts will interpret state environmental policy acts
narrowly. 295 If IEPA did not explicitly establish a standard of review,
Indiana courts might hold that they do not have the power to conduct such review-even though that power is apparent under IAOPA. By clearly
establishing the role of the courts, the General Assembly can ensure that the
courts will observe their duties and supervise agencies' decisions under IEPA.
Requiring a plaintiff to exhaust all the available administrative remedies
before bringing an action under IEPA might detract from the statute's force.

290. MANDELKER, supra note 5, § 12.03, at 12-16; see also Lawrence Gerschwer, Note,
InformationalStanding Under NEPA: Justiciabilityand the EnvironmentalDecisionmakingProcess, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 996, 1021 (1993).
291. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21168, 21168.5; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.090.
292. City of Indianapolis v. Hargis, 588 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind. 1992).
293. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278 (Cal.
1988); Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429 (N.Y. 1986).
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As noted with regard to Indiana's Environmental Protection Act, requiring a
plaintiff to exhaust all administrative remedies before obtaining relief from the
courts may deter plaintiffs from bringing such suits.29 6 This requirement
reduces the plaintiff s involvement in the early phases of the action and makes
the plaintiff a powerless observer of the agency processes. Thus, IEPA
lawsuits are less attractive, particularly to environmental public interest groups
which benefit through the publicity they garner during a high profile lawsuit.
By contrast, providing plaintiffs direct access to the courts brings them to the
center of the action and allows them greater control over the ultimate
resolution of the controversy. By amending IEPA to allow plaintiffs direct
access to the courts, the legislature would increase public awareness of, and
involvement in, agency decision-making by allowing citizens to challenge
agency decisions. This advances the statute's second objective.
Therefore, the General Assembly should amend IEPA to allow plaintiffs
direct access to the courts to challenge an agency for failing to comply with
the statute. In addition, the Act should specifically establish that the court
may review the agency's decision under the substantial evidence standard. By
implementing these changes, as well as clarifying the scope of the Act and
making it applicable to actions licensed or permitted by state agencies, the
General Assembly can ensure that agencies would take their environmental
obligations seriously and will substantially further the purposes of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The methods Indiana uses to protect its environment do not rank highly
among the states. In a study by the Council of State Governments, Indiana
ranked "near the bottom in two significant measures of state expenditures on
environmental programs. Indiana ranked forty-ninth in per capita spending,
and forty-seventh in expenditures as a percentage of the total state budget."'2 97 Another means of evaluating a state's environmental programs is to
consider the laws the state uses to protect its natural resources. Merely having
laws on the books is not enough, however. Those laws must clearly set forth
standards and procedures governing actions which affect the environment.
These standards should be judged in light of the policies that the state seeks
to promote.
The Indiana Environmental Policy Act sets forth broad policies and
purposes, yet its action-forcing provisions ultimately fail to meet or advance
these goals. The Act attempts to ensure that government agencies will give a

296. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
297. Newby et al., supra note 19, at 333.
Despite an obvious increase in concern about environmental degradation on the part of
legislators and the general public alike, the state government has, in large part, failed to either
address the major environmental issues with effective legislation or to provide the state's
environmental agencies with sufficient staff or funding to administer existing programs. The
legislature may also have inadvertently weakened Indiana's environmental protection strategy
by effectively denying private citizen participation in the enforcement process.
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hard look to the environmental effects of their actions; however, its provisions
do not clearly establish the types of actions which are covered or even what
constitutes the "environment." Ultimately, the Act is too flexible to be able
to ensure that its procedural mandates are met. The Act also fails to meet its
second goal of encouraging public involvement in decisions that affect the
environment. Since IEPA does not include any mention of judicial review,
individuals cannot challenge the agency's decision and ensure that the agency
has in fact taken the required hard look.
By amending IEPA, the General Assembly could clarify the statute's scope
and advance the statute's goals. First, the General Assembly should repeal
Section 13-1-10-6, which exempts state permits and licenses from the Act's
procedural requirements. By repealing this section, the General Assembly
would require environmental review for additional types of actions and would
require that state agencies give more consideration to environmental effects.
Second, the General Assembly should clarify, and even expand, the scope of
the statute. The threshold for requiring environmental impact statements
should be lowered, the terms of the statute defined, and the actions which are
covered specified. This would inform agencies, and the public, when the
statute applies and would advance the goal of forcing agencies to carefully
consider the effects that their actions have on the environment. Third, the
General Assembly should specify in the Act what standards ofjudicial review
will be applied to the agencies' decisions. This would not only encourage
agencies to prepare environmental impact statements but would also invite the
scrutiny of the public.
Implementing these changes will not make IEPA a perfect statute.
Eventually, the General Assembly may want to consider whether the Act
should also be applied to local actions or whether the Act ought to guarantee
Indiana's citizens the right to a healthful environment. President Theodore
Roosevelt once stated that foresight and planning are essential for avoiding
environmental disaster. 28 By amending IEPA, the General Assembly can
ensure that agencies exercise foresight with an eye to preserving the state's
natural resources. Such action would show a significant reordering of the
state's priorities and would represent a valuable step in protecting Indiana's
environment for many years to come.

298. Specifically, President Roosevelt stated:
We have become great in a material sense because of the lavish use of our resources, and we
have just reason to be proud of our growth. But the time has come to inquire seriously what will
happen when our forests are gone ... when the soils shall have been further impoverished and

washed into the streams .... These questions do not relate only to the next century or to the next
generation. One distinguishing characteristic of really civilized men is foresight... and if we do
not exercise that foresight, dark will be the future!
Theodore R. Roosevelt, Opening Address by the President, in PROCEEDING OF A CONFERENCE OF
GovERNORs IN THE WHITE HousE, at 3-12 (1909).

